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To the stranger the gates of my house are not closed;
the rice jar is on the left,
and the sweetmeats on the right, as you enter.
Two sayings of the Master:
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I. INTRODUCTION: AMERICA APPROACHES THE 21ST CENTURY
Peek into any U.S. hotel or restaurant kitchen, and you are likely to spy
foreigners without green cards through the dishwater steam. These
workers are known as "illegal aliens" or more benignly as "undocument-
ed workers," depending on your view of the issue. Foreigners unautho-
rized to work in the United States can also be found in garment facto-
ries, tomato fields, parking garages, taxi cabs, behind a broom, and
performing a host of other tasks whose common features are long hours,
scut work, and low pay. Millions of such workers continue to flood the
BRET HARTE, Wan Lee, The Pagan, in THE OUTCASTS OF POKER FLAT AND
OTHER TALES 214 (New Am. Libr. ed. 1961) (from THE WRITINGS OF BRET HARTE,
Houghton Mifflin & Co. 1896-1904).
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labor force, despite a long-fought 1986 immigration-reform law that
liberalized legal immigration in exchange for what was supposed to be
a crackdown on unlawful entry and employment.'
WHAT MAKES CONTEMPORARY AMERICA? Is it the varied and still-
vast natural contours of her lands? Does she emanate from new ideas,
traditions, and effervescent dreams? Does America present herself to the
world as a place of constitutional bounties rich in enumerated rights and
privileges derived from the rule of law? Or does Columbia's true glory
shine in the polyglot, melting pot of cultures - a rich layering over
Anglo-Saxon and Judeo-Christian traditions, nuanced today by nearly
every race, creed, and cultural mix on the face of the earth?
In the present-day United States, the people and their representatives
talk of the many sources of change quaking American society. Americans,
for example, have varying feelings about the downsizing, reorganizing,
and reengineering of American businesses and institutions, and the impact
on the economy and jobs of the technological revolution.3 Managed
2 See Robert Kuttner, Illegal Immigration: Would a National ID Card Help?, in
ARGUING IMMGRATION: ARE NEw IMMIGRANTS A WEALTH OF DmvEsrry ... OR A
CRUSHING BURDEN? 81 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994) [hereinafter ARGUING IMMIGRATION].
The terminology is debatable. It makes more sense in many cases to use the term
"undocumented" vs. "illegal" alien, because, technically an undocumented alien cannot
reasonably be called the latter until a proceeding or administrative determination has
ascertained his or her status as "illegal." The reasons for lack of documentation could
be valid and widely varied, including loss or theft of documentation, pending status, or
valid refugee or asylee status.
' At one IBM location a department's productivity was allegedly improved "not
100 percent, but one hundred times" (or 100% x 100% = 10,000%) through the re-
duction of credit checking departmental personnel down to virtually one person. See
Simon Head, The New, Ruthless Economy, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Feb. 29, 1996, at 47
(critically reviewing MICHAEL HAMMER & JAMES CHAMPY, REENGINEERING Tim
COMORATION: A MANIFESTO FOR BUSImESS REVOLUTION 39 (1993)). Many social
scientists, sociologists, and pop philosophers have heralded the "information superhigh-
way" and the technological revolution as the end of all political, economic, and social
hierarchies everywhere as power "[devolves] downward to the people and [they are
liberated] from the constraints of the centralized, tyrranical organizations in which they
once worked." FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST 23-24 and 24 n.1 (1995) (discussing ALVIN
TOFFLER & HEIDI TOFFLER, WAR AND ANTI-WAR: SURVIVAL AT THE DAWN OF THE
21ST CENTURY (1993); PETER W. HUBER, ORWELL'S REVENGE: THE 1984 PALIMPSEsT
(1994)). Others are not so sanguine. Sociologists Stanley Aronowitz and William
DeFazio have argued that the rise of computerized technology has created a
"technoculture," replacing skill and craft with button-pushing "knowledge workers,"
resulting in the "proletarianization" of engineers, university professors, doctors, and other
professionals. See STANLEY ARONOwrfz & WILLIAM DEFAZIO, THE JOBLESS FUTURE
1998]
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health care, originating on the west coast, has now swept across the
country, and people are becoming accustomed to the presence of managed
care organizations in the healthcare relationship between patients and
physicians Impassioned discussions are occurring over crime, family
values, the right to die, and many other legal, socio-cultural, and political
issues.' Not least among questions rolling over the U.S. socio-economic
and political fabric are those dealing with the absorption of an in-
creasingly more visible component of American society - the undocu-
mented alien."
81-138 (1994).
Sophisticated computers, robots, telecommunications, and other Information Age technolo-
gies are replacing human beings in nearly every sector. Factory workers, secretaries, re-
ceptionists, clerical workers, salesclerks, bank tellers, telephone operators, librarians,
wholesalers, and middle managers are just a few of the many occupations destined for
virtual extinction. In the United States alone, as many as 90 million jobs in a labor
force of 124 million are potentially vulnerable to displacement by automation.
Jeremy Rifkin, Vanishing Jobs, MoTHER JONES, Sept-Oct. 1995, at 58, 60.
' One of the last entrants in the race to develop managed care organizations
(MCOs) was the State of New York, which still prohibits for-profit hospitals and was
one of the last states to permit operation of HMOs. Financial writers argue that New
York should join the rest of the country in allowing the formation of physician practice
management companies (PPMs), more MCOs and HMOs, and for-profit hospitals to
streamline taxes and benefit costs. See Health Reform, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS., Apr. 15,
1996, at 8. As part of the national trend, the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP) has decided to license its name to health maintenance organizations that meet
"its standards on financial stability, commitment to quality, price and popularity with
current members." Milt Freudenheim, AARP Will License Its Name to Managed Health
Care Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1996, at Al. Although the Clinton administration
lost its Capitol Hill battle to install governmental oversight into the managed care
apparatus, managed care plans increasingly picked up membership via voluntary
enrollees who later complained of the limiting controls in HMOs and MCOs. See Robin
Toner, Harry and Louise Were Right, Sort Of, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1996, 4, at 1.
S For an excellent discussion of the debate over legalizing physician-assisted
suicide, see Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1996).
6 In a crescendo of sentiment over the issue of the undocumented alien, on Sep-
tember 30, 1996 major legislation was signed into law amending the Immigration &
Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1953)
(codified at 8 U.S.C). The new law which wended its way through the House as the
Immigration in the National Interest Act, H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. (1996), and the
Senate as the Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act, S. 1664, 104th
Cong. (1996), completed its journey as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 [hereinafter
IIRIRA]. The Senate version had passed by a vote of 97-3. See Joe Davidson, Illegal
Immigrants Are Target of Bill Passed by Senate, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1996, at A14;
[Vol. 30:57
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This Article presents a discussion of the rights and privileges of
aliens in general and undocumented aliens in particular as premised on
constitutional and legal bases. It addresses universal historical, economic,
and socio-political aspects of the undocumented alien issue, and also
discusses future trends and some recent Immigration & Naturalization
Service (INS) and court decisions dealing particularly with undocumented
aliens, deportation, etc. Finally, the material concludes with suggestions
for ways in which the legal system should approach a subject that is as
germane to and as much a part of America's heritage as its governmental
and political institutions.
II. THE UNDOCUMENTED ALIEN DEBATE: WHY THEY COME AND "THE
BURDEN ON SOCIETY"
"Civilization's going to pieces," broke out Tom violently. "I've
gotten to be a terrible pessimist about things. Have you read 'The Rise
of the Colored Empires' by this man Goddard?"
"Why, no," I answered, rather surprised by his tone.
"Well, it's a fine book, and everybody ought to read it. The idea
is if we don't look out the white race will be - will be utterly sub-
merged. It's all scientific stuff; it's been proved."
"The idea is that we're Nordics. I am, and you are, and you are,
and -- " After an infinitesimal hesitation he included Daisy with a slight
nod, and she winked at me again."- And we've produced all the things
that go to make civilization - oh, science and art, and all that. Do you
see?'
7
Eric Schmitt, Senate Votes Bill to Reduce Influx of Illegal Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1996, at Al. The next day the President signed a bill making Mother Teresa an
honorary United States citizen. See Joint Resolution to Confer Honorary Citizenship of
the United States on Agnes Gonxha Bojaxhiu, also known as Mother Teresa, Pub. L.
No. 104-218, 110 Stat. 3021 (1996).
7 F. ScoT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 13-14 (Charles Scribners' Sons 1953)
(1925). But consider, "Who among us is aboriginal? Indeed those who are aboriginal,
the ones we call Native Americans, are the only ones we treat as badly as we treat
new immigrants." Kristen M. Schuler, Equal Protection and the Undocumented
Immigrant: California's Proposition 187, 16 B.C. TID WORLD LJ. 275 (1996) (ci-
tations omitted) (quoting the oral argument of an attorney who represented schoolchil-
dren in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California during injunctive
proceedings aimed at halting California's anti-undocumented-alien initiative - Propo-
sition 187).
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A. Labels: Aliens, Immigrants, Natives, Nationals, and Citizens
Discourse over aliens and immigration - much of it inflammatory
has been raging in regard to the controls that should be put in place
to channel legal immigration and to curtail the entry and effect removal
of undocumented aliens due to the alleged burdens they place on U.S.
institutions, social services, and the job market.' Aliens who are present
' On an average day in the New York Times editorial pages, the day in fact when
the U.S. Senate passed the new bill targeting undocumented aliens, an American
engineer in California wrote that rather than drive wages down, aliens have helped
increase wages in the Silicon Valley, and the President of the National Association of
Manufacturers claimed that immigrants with technical skills have helped create jobs.
Still another writer, assumedly an immigrant descendant, said that "[l]egal immigration
brings skilled workers, artists and professionals to the United States. This is a country
founded and built by immigrants, from whose efforts we gain and prosper. Their
descendants want illegal immigration curbed and legal immigration left alone." Refugees
from Mutilation, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1996, at A22.
One prominent journalist warned in 1996 that provisions of recent amendments to
the Immigration & Nationality Act would "effectively insulate the [Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS)] from correction of abusive or illegal decisions." Anthony
Lewis, Mean and Petty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at A31. Mr. Lewis was apparently
referring to H.R. 2202 and its expedited hearing provision for refugees. Although
American immigration policies have been insulated from judicial review, federal
constitutional review of immigration policies, legislation, and federal administrative
decisions has occurred during the 120-plus years of official federal immigration policy,
particularly since the 1970s. It is clear, however, that the earliest federal review of
government action was heavily flawed by racial and cultural discrimination and other
inappropriate considerations, disparately burdening what were later labelled suspect
classifications. "Chinese persons, not born in this country, have never been recognized
as citizens of the United States, nor authorized to become such under the naturalization
laws." Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 716 (1893) (upholding § 6 of
the Chinese Exclusion Act of May 5, 1892 which extended a ban on immigrant
Chinese for 10 years, and required their arrest if they were unable to produce certifi-
cates of residence). One Chinese habeas corpus petitioner, who was a long-term U.S.
resident, was found excludable because he failed to provide one white witness to testify
in his behalf, being able to provide "none but Chinese witnesses." Id. at 731, 732. As
another example from the period, about 20 years later, "[one] federal court...
concluded that the son of a German father and a Japanese mother [could not] acquire
citizenship, since 'it cannot be said that one who is half-white and half brown or
yellow is a white person, as commonly understood."' ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT
JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUrIoNAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS 13 (1985) (quoting In re
Young, 198 F. 715, 717 (W.D. Wash. 1912)).
Although largely immune from review, current domestic INS determinations may
receive review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), § 10(e), 5 U.S.C.
[Vol. 30:57
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in the United States without documentation are usually referred to as "il-
legal" or "undocumented," although there are other statuses such as
"parolee," where the pending, undetermined status of the alien is likely to
be approved. For purposes of this Article, an unauthorized alien will be
categorized as "illegal," only where that person is either (1) present in the
United States against the express wishes of the U.S. government (through
fraud, as a criminal fugitive, etc.) or (2) where the alien has violated the
terms and conditions of his or her visa, clearly placing the alien in
circumstances which may be construed as illegal.9 "Undocumented alien"
- preferred here - is a better term of reference because there are many
cases in our Byzantine system of immigration where an alien's status is
ambiguous and remains to be determined."0 Additionally, it is more use-
§ 706(2) (1988). "Mandatory agency determinations, those in which the agency has no
exercise of discretion if certain eligibility standards are met, must be supported by
substantial evidence in the administrative record; discretionary determinations are subject
to review under an abuse-of-discretion or arbitrariness standard." AuSTIN T. FRAGOMEN,
JR. & STEvEN C. BELL, IBMGRATION FuNDAMENTALS 1-7 (4th ed. 1996) (citations
omitted). "Due process also requires that the executive abide by both the statute and
the regulations it has promulgated to effectuate the statute's terms." Id. (citing Bridges
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945)). "To prevent the immigration laws from producing
excessively harsh effects, Congress included provisions in the Immigration and National-
ity Act under which the Attorney General may, at his discretion, suspend an alien's
deportation." Susan L. Kamlet, Judicial Review of "Extreme Hardship" in Suspension
of Deportation, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 175 (1984) (citations omitted).
9 "Illegal alien" does appear as a defined term in both 8 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988)
and 29 C.F.R. 500.20(n) (1992), but the two definitions are context-driven and
inconsistent. The former specifies a category of aliens who were unlawfully in the
United States at the time they committed a felony, and the latter refers to aliens
without employment authorization." Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American
Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1899 n.413 (1993) [hereinafter
Neuman, Lost Century]. The recent IIRIRA amendments to the INA more freely use
the term "illegal alien." See, e.g., "Sec. 329 Demonstration Project for Identification of
Illegal Aliens in Incarceration Facility of Anaheim California" and "Sec. 502 Pilot
Programs on Limiting Issuance of Driver's Licenses to Illegal Aliens." Other euphemis-
tic context-driven modifiers include "inadmissible," "deportable," and "unlawful." See
IRIRA, supra note 6 and accompanying text. "Inadmissible" appears to be the term of
art for "excludable" under amendments to Section 212 of the INA. See id. § 308(d)(1),
308(d)(2).
" Not everyone agrees:
In truth, some immigration advocates haven't been much more forthright [than Governor
Pete Wilson in repatriating imported 'temporary workers']. After working tirelessly and
effectively to stymie INS enforcement, they now express wonder and dismay when the
public demands swift, heavy-handed responses to this complex problem. They insist that
aliens who enter surreptitiously should be called 'undocumented' rather than 'illegal' be-
cause their legal status remains uncertain for months or years during which the aliens
19981
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ful to call the individuals involved "aliens"" rather than "immigrants,"'
2
even though many undocumented aliens intend to remain in the United
States indefinitely because the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 3
obliquely defines immigrant as every alien who does not fit within one of
the classes of nonimmigrant aliens. 4
The INA classifies individuals subject to its jurisdiction, as aliens,
citizens, etc. Although "citizen" is not defined, "national of the United
States" is: "The term 'national of the United States' means (A) a citizen
of the United States, or (B) a person, who, though not a citizen of the
United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States."'5
can usually obtain work permits, an uncertainty that is largely the product of the
advocates' own skillful manipulations of an increasingly vulnerable administrative system.
Peter H. Schuck, The Message of 187: Facing Up to Illegal Immigration, 21 AM.
PRosPECT, Spring 1995, at 85, 92. "Wilson surely knows that Proposition 187 could
have dire practical consequences for his state, and he may secretly hope that an activist
court will rescue him by striking it down." Id.
" "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United
States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1988 & 1997 Supp.). Alien has been defined to be
"one born out of the jurisdiction of the United States, and who has not been natural-
ized under [the U.S.] Constitution and laws." Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460,
473 (1912).
2 Some activists espousing rights for the undocumented, however, insist on the
label "undocumented immigrant." See Schuler, supra note 7.
'3 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1645 (1988 & 1997 Supp.).
14 "The term 'immigrant' means every alien except an alien who is within one of
the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens" 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1988 & 1997
Supp.). The classes are listed at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)-(R) (1988 & 1997 Supp.).
The IMIRA preserves definitions of "alien" and "immigrant" as they are described
under "section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act." IRIRA, supra note 6,
§ l(c).
5 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (1988 & 1997 Supp.). Citizens and nationals (in most
aspects) are protected under the U.S. Constitution. Persons born in the United States are
citizens at birth, while other citizens are persons who are naturalized or who acquire
citizenship under the laws enacted by Congress. "Persons born in Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands (including Saipan and
Tinian) ...are citizens of the United States .... Persons born in American Samoa
and Swains Island, which are defined under the nationality law as 'outlying
possessions,' are nationals but not citizens, of the United States." DAVID CARLINER El
AL., THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS AND REFUGEES 2 (2d ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
"Persons born in other possessions of the United States [such as Wake and Midway]
- are treated as persons born outside the United States and are aliens unless ... they
qualify as citizens under other provisions of the nationality laws." Id. "A person born
in the Panama Canal Zone, over which the United States exercised sovereignty until
1978, is also a citizen of the United States if born prior to 1978, and if at birth, one
parent was a citizen." Id. (footnote omitted).
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Although aliens are subject to the controls of the INA, nationals of the
United States are not, with several exceptions: (1) nationals of the
United States who are naturalized citizens are subject to denaturalization
under circumstances enumerated in the INA; (2) all citizens of the
United States may expatriate themselves under provisions set forth in the
INA; and (3) all persons, nationals of the United States and aliens alike,
are subject to inspection and a determination of admissibility on arrival
at a U.S. port of entry. Otherwise, only aliens are within the jurisdiction
of the INA and its provisions. United States citizens who lose citizen-
ship because of expatriation or denaturalization become aliens for
purposes of the INA's provisions. 6
The INA distinguishes between its definition of a "national"17 of a
country and "native," which although undefined is important in practice.
"[W]hen an alien is allotted an immigrant visa, the allotment is charged
against the total available from his or her country of nativity, regardless
of the alien's country of present nationality. In contrast, aliens are eligible
for nonimmigrant status as investors or traders under treaties between the
United States and the country of the alien's nationality; the alien's place
of birth is irrelevant to eligibility for treaty status."'8
Under common parlance, most nonlegal, non-INS materials (such as
social science monographs) categorize aliens as immigrant or nonimmi-
grant, legal or undocumented (or illegal), or refugees, 9 taking various
positions on the issue of unauthorized immigration.
The "refugee" category, comprised of aliens considered undocu-
mented until a determination is made of their appropriate status, usually
receives a large share of political interest. The Refugee Act of 1980'
16 FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 8, at 1-22. The term "national of the United
States" embraces diverse subgroups in addition to "citizens," such as residents of
territories and possessions, but not does not include "aliens." Scholz v. Shaughnessy,
180 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1950). The term held more importance during the periods when
the United States governed the Philippines as a colony and before Alaska and Hawaii
achieved statehood.
"7 "The term 'national' means a person owing permanent allegiance to a state." 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21) (1988 & 1997 Supp.).
" FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 8, at 1-22-1-23.
'9 "Noncitizens consist of 'immigrants,' who have made the United States their
home, and 'nonimmigrants,' who may be just passing through; 'undocumented,' or
'illegal' aliens, whose entrance or continued presence in the United States is unautho-
rized, and 'refugees,' who are fleeing persecution." HULL, supra note 8, at 5.
Aliens and Nationality Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-59, 1521-1525 and amending various sections of the
nIA).
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was passed to create a "coherent and comprehensive" rather than a "reac-
tive and ad hoe" system for dealing with refugees.2 The term "refugee"
has an expansive definition under the INA, which reads:
The term 'refugee' means (A) any person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationali-
ty, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided,
and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion, or (B) in such special circumstances as the President after
appropriate consultation (as defined in section 1157(e) of this title) may
specify, any person who is within the country of such person's na-
tionality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the
country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is perse-
cuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. The term 'refugee' does not include any person who ordered,
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any
person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion ...
Until the present day, the statute did not speak to persecution on the
basis of gender, which is currently a topical issue particularly in the
realm of female mutilation.' 3 Although during the last forty years, the
21 HULL, supra note 8, at 119, 209 n.29.
The United States pursued a largely ad hoc approach to refugee admissions into the
1970's. Although some refugees were admitted under regular immigration procedures, the
bulk of the refugee admissions were authorized by special immigration programs, outside
the regular immigration channels. The Attorney General's discretionary authority to
parole aliens into the United States temporarily was used as the vehicle for the
admission of refugees, and special legislation was then usually enacted to enable them
to adjust their status to permanent resident. Refugee groups handled in this manner
included the Cubans in the 1960's and the Indochinese in the 1970's.
History of the Immigration & Naturalization Service, SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
SELECr COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 77
(Comm. Print 1980) (Prepared at the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chair-
mlan).
mn 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988 & 1997 Supp.). The 1996 IIRIRA amends refugee
status to include "Persecution for Resistance to Coercive Population Control Methods,"
i.e., forced sterilization or abortion. IIRIRA, supra note 6, § 601.
' As an example, Fauziya Kasinga fled her native Togo to escape the fate of
genital mutilation, but was initially denied asylum. On appeal, "[i]n legal papers filed
with the Appeals Board, the Immigration and Naturalization Service says that female
[Vol. 30:57
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United States has been relatively generous to refugees and asylees -
particularly politically favored groups - this was not the case during
periods of political isolation, such as the 1920s through the mid-1940s.
Additionally, a recurring problem is that individual INS determinations
under the refugee statute may not be philosophically consistent since
immigration judges may engage in rigid or formalistic analysis. One case
exemplifying the proceedings was that of Sofia Campos-Guardado, a
Salvadoran refugee, who sought asylum on the basis of her gender. She
had been forced to watch male attackers hack flesh from workers on a
farm before they were shot, and then she and other female witnesses were
raped while male attackers shouted political slogans. The attackers let
loose the victims, threatening to kill them unless they fled immediately.
Sofia Campos-Guardado's request for asylum was denied by the 5th
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in 1987. Despite her brutalization, the
court concluded that she "had not shown that the attackers harmed her
in order to overcome any of her own political opinions." Her rape,
genital mutilation presents a 'new and difficult' area in law but agrees that it involves
an extreme bodily invasion that 'shocks the conscience.' The I.N.S. recommend[ed] that
Ms. Kasinga's case be reconsidered by the immigration judge." Refugees from Mutila-
tion, supra note 8. At the hearing, the INS lawyer argued before the Immigration
Board of Appeals that the case should be sent back to the original hearing judge. The
Board regarded the appellant, who had been held in a New Jersey detention center and
Pennsylvania prisons with sympathy, and appeared to find Ms. Kasinga's story of the
barbaric practice credible - the same story that the original judge had found "not only
unbelievable but also irrational and unpersuasive." Celia W. Dugger, Board Hears
Asylum Appeal in Genital-Mutilation Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at B5.
Responding to public outcry, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996 addresses feminist issues. IRIRA, supra note 6. Section 652
of the Act regulates the "Mail-Order Bride Business" of approximately 200 "interna-
tional matchmaking organization[s]" in the United States, and proscribes fraud in these
types of dealings, imposing civil penalties of $20,000 for failing to provide "recruits"
for "dating, matrimonial, or social referral services," "information regarding conditional
permanent residence status and the battered spouse waiver under such status, permanent
residence status, marriage fraud penalties, the unregulated nature of the business en-
gaged in by such organizations," and a mandated study by the Attorney General.
RIRIRA, supra note 6, § 652. Sections 644 and 645 address concerns over "Female
Genital Mutilation," with Section 645 attempting to make the activity a federal crime,
stating that "the practice of female genital mutilation can be prohibited without
abridging the exercise of any rights guaranteed under the First Amendment to the
Constitution or under any other law," and that "Congress has the affirmative power
under Section 8 of Article I, the necessary and proper clause, section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as under the treaty clause, to the Constitution to enact
such legislation,." Id. §§ 644-45.
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which occurred at her uncle's farm, was instead viewed as a conse-
quence of his involvement in a land-reform movement. As Deborah
Sontag wrote in the New York Times, the fact that an assailant had since
threatened to kill Campos-Guardado and her family if she were to reveal
him was deemed "entirely personal." The court concluded that Campos-
Guardado "failed to show that the harm she fears - no matter how
likely - is on account of 'political opinion' or 'membership in a social
group,' as those terms are used in the statute."
24
B. Why They Come and the Debate About Burdens
Promptly at seven... Jurgis reported for work. He came to the door
that had been pointed out to him, and there he waited for nearly two
hours. The boss had meant for him to enter, but had not said this, and
so it was only when on his way out to hire another man that he came
upon Jurgis. He gave him a good cursing, but as Jurgis did not under-
stand a word of it, he did not object. He followed the boss, who
showed him where to put his street clothes ... then he led him to the
'killing beds' . ...As Jurgis came in, the first cattle of the morning
were just making their appearance; and so, with scarcely time to look
about him, and none to speak to anyone, he fell to work. It was a
sweltering day in July, and the place ran with steaming hot blood -
one waded in it on the floor. The stench was almost overpowering, but
to Jurgis it was nothing. His whole soul was dancing with joy - he was
at work at last! He was at work and earning money! ... [He went
home to the family with the tidings that he had earned more than a
dollar and half in a single day!'
It is estimated that 800,000 aliens legally immigrated to the United
States during 1994,' while about 750,000 legal admissions were autho-
rized for 1995. These numbers can be contrasted with the major upswing
during 1985-1991 when it was reported that 6,472,087 immigrants were
24 Julie Hessler, Gender-Based Asylum, in ARGUING IMMIGRATION, supra note 2, at
212-13.
25 UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 53 (Penguin Books 1986) (1906).
' See Steven A. Holmes, House Panel Keeps Intact Bill to Restrict Immigration,
N.Y. TrIms, Oct. 12, 1995, at A20; William Tamayo, When the "Coloreds" Are
Neither Black nor Citizens: The United States Civil Rights Movement and Global
Migration, 2 AsIAN L.J. 1, at *4 (1995), available in WESTLAW, Immigration Law
File. The author states between 800,000 and 850,000 immigrants enter the U.S. legally
each year, and that 200,000 to 300,000 undocumented aliens also enter annually. Id. at
*11.
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legally admitted to the United States or were legalized; among these were
2,920,627 under family reunification programs, including relatives of U.S.
citizens; 2,464,347 former illegals grandfathered under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986; about 687,887 refugees and asylees;
and only 388,476 employment preference immigrants, including spouses
and children.' Although many different reasons are given by immigrant
aliens for choosing to come to the United States - education, health
care, the vision of American opportunity in general - the most popular
impetus has been pure economics2 s "According to the U.S. Census
Bureau, of the estimated four million illegal immigrants who have entered
the United States since 1970, fifty-two percent live in California."29
Aside from obvious motivations such as flight from persecution or
the object of reunifying families, nonimmigrant aliens come to the United
States for a wide diversity of reasons - schooling, job training, U.S.
postings by a foreign firm or government, or as authorized temporary
workers. Undocumented aliens often start out their journey in an nonim-
migrant status such as tourist, student, migrant worker - the same as any
other nonimmigrant alien - but one day a decision is made to overstay
authorized U.S. presence and status eventually transmogrifies into "undoc-
umented." Many undocumented aliens, too, have dispensed with what they
' See F.H. Buckley, The Political Economy of Immigration Policies, 16 INT'L Ray.
L. & EcoN. 81, 92-93 (1996). The author's article is a statistical study on the
"quality" of American vs. Canadian immigrants under the theory that Canadian policies
yield "superior" immigrants, using various governmental studies and similar publications
as sources for the data cited. The author states that "[s]o strong is the American
aversion to screening for immigrant quality that about 35,000 slots for 'diversity' mi-
grants are awarded each year by lot," with 42,000 having been scheduled for 1994. Id.
at 93, 93 n.47.
' See Linda Chavez, Immigration Politics, in ARGUiNG IMMIGRATION, supra note
2, at 35. Immigrant economic success has been significant. Chavez cited per capita in-
come for immigrants (assumedly in the early 1990s) at $15,003 compared to a national
average for native-born Americans of $14,367, while "Africans" were stated as
averaging $20,177. The rate of participation, Chavez says, by some immigrant groups
in the labor force such as Haitians, Jamaicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Peruvians,
and Filipinos is 10 points higher than participation by the native born. Id. Unemployed
Irish college graduates came to the New World in the 1980s-early 1990s, prospered in
the New York City area, and have since set up a "huge network of support and
economic power," a key element of which is the Irish Business Organization (IBO)
comprised of a membership whose average age is 35. David Medina, Arriving Irish
Seeing Green, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., June 10-16, 1996, at 38. In New York City, immi-
grant entrepreneurship has replaced entry-level work. See Lisa Goff, New Immigrants
Discover How to Create Own Jobs, CRAiN's N.Y. Bus., Nov. 25-Dec. 1, 1996, at 17.
" Theresa A. Parker, The California Story: Immigrants Come to California as a
Result of Federal - Not State - Policies, 52 PuB. WELFARE, Spring 1994, at 16.
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perceive to be the futility of application for legal entry and instead make
furtive border crossings, dodging U.S. border guards, incurring the wrath
of government officials, and exciting negative public opinion. The penal-
ties for being caught can be detention and deportation." So what other
reasons impel the undocumented to come - and more important - why
do they stay?
Across the United States, aliens, many of them undocumented,
visibly occupy jobs that Americans either cannot do because they lack the
requisite skills or will not do because they perceive the jobs as unwor-
thy." Alien ubiquity is evidenced in numerous tableaux: Colorado ski
resorts where aliens have supplanted the classic "ski bum" working as ski
' The chances of being caught, detained, and deported have the aura of a "lottery
of fate," since it has not been possible with the elimination of limited ports of entry
such as Ellis Island in New York City in 1954 to contain illegal immigrant influx, due
to limited INS resources, flaws in the immigration system, and relatively porous U.S.
borders. There are patterns to the policy of detention, however, with certain groups
such as Salvadorans and Haitians having been overrepresented in the category of long-
term detainees. In the sample year of 1984, prior to the passage of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 225 Salvadorans were detained for up to
nine months and 97 Nicaraguans for 12-18 months, while 327 Haitians were detained
for periods of 12-18 months. See Cushing N. Dolbeare, Detention of Undocumented
Aliens: Actions by the INS Prior to Adoption of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 12-13 (1990). Only 53 Mexican detainees were kept for periods of three
to six months during the same year due to the INS policy of immediately returning
Mexicans to Mexico. Id. at 6, 13. Detention was reinstituted during the 1980s to
replace the policy in place for about 25 years of paroling undocumented aliens who
were neither a national security threat nor likely to abscond. Id. at 1-2. The detention
policy was an emergency response by the Carter administration to the Marielito exodus
of 125,000 Cubans, and was made an official INS policy during the Reagan administra-
tion following a flood of Haitian "boat people" into southern Florida. Id. Since the
government had implemented the detention policy without following the rulemaking
process required under the Administrative Procedure Act, 1,800 Haitian detainees were
ordered released in 1982. See Louis v. Nelson, 544 F.Supp. 973, 1003-04 (S.D. Fla.
1982). The INS published an interim rule thereafter, which was made permanent in
October 1982. See Dolbeare, supra, at 2.
Title mI of IRIRA is entitled "Inspection, Apprehension, Detention, Adjudication,
and Removal of Inadmissible and Deportable Aliens," devoting 88 sections to undocu-
mented and other alien removal. IIRIRA, supra note 6, §§ 301-388.
31
Entry-level jobs, which are frequently temporary, dirty, and low-paying, are often char-
acterized as jobs that 'Americans don't want' - except perhaps for American teenagers,
who expect to move into more attractive jobs when they are older and more experi-
enced.
Frank D. Bean & Teresa A. Sullivan, Confronting the Problem, 22 SoC. Sci. 67, 71
(1985).
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instructors, chambermaids, janitors, and sales clerks;32 in the New York
area with immigrant talent fueling entrepreneurial ventures;33 and at Bryn
Mawr, near Philadelphia, where a penniless war refugee seeded by physi-
cian investors has started her own international trading company.'
The flip side to these happy vignettes is the jarring accusation that
immigrants are also driving U.S. wages down and are taking jobs away
from U.S. workers.
Blacks squeezed out of the local economy in L.A. were likewise being
squeezed out nationally. Economic statistics repeatedly illuminated the
concurrence of events that have conspired to marginalize struggling
blacks. The increasing influx of immigrants exacerbated our crisis. While
blacks were being pushed out of the marketplace by recession and wide-
spread apathy, that same American marketplace was accommodating a
ground swell of immigrants, privileged and underprivileged, from as far
away as the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Vietnam and Korea.
Their presence pushed blacks out of the marketplace altogether.3
32 See James Brooke, Foreigners Flock to Slopes to Work, Not Ski, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 29, 1995, at A16. West Africans, Mexicans, Russians, and Eastern Europeans are
the most common groups to be found, and most of them are not at all interested in
skiing. "ITihe Denver office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates
that the number of illegal aliens in Colorado has grown to about 22,000 today, from
17,500 three years ago. The Federal agency has 17 field agents to control immigration
in this state." Id.
I Stories reminiscent of the time-worn tradition of immigrant success abound in
today's New York which has long been an entryway for immigrants into American
society. See Judith Massina, A Gift of Tongues: New Immigrants Drive High Tech in
IVY, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus., Apr. 8-14, 1996, at 3, 41 (stating that in 1990, immigrants
held more than one-third of New York City technical jobs although representing only
25% of the population.); Virginia Citrano, Skirting Unprofitable Lines Helps to Cut It
in Hard Times, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus., Apr. 29, 1996, at 14 (describing the story of a
Chinese student who graduated from the Fashion Institute of Technology in 1970s,
started a fashion business with $5,000, and whose company expected $15 million in
1996 sales).
' See Thomas Petzinger, Jr., Though Worlds Apart, Partners Find Success on
Common Ground, WAML ST. J., May 3, 1996, at B1. A former Vietnamese social
worker, who started out in the United States as a hospital records clerk, began an
international trading business in 1993 with the backing of Pennsylvania doctors. The
business now has sales of about $2,500,000 per year in cameras alone. Her next
venture is to open up McDonald's franchises for her contacts in Vietnam. See id.
3' Wanda Coleman, Blacks, Immigrants and America, THE NATION, Feb. 15, 1993,
at 187, 189 (commenting on the riots following the Rodney King beating verdict in
Los Angeles). But cf Bean & Sullivan, supra note 31 ("It is not acceptable as a matter
of public policy to relegate these jobs to native-born adults from minority groups. If
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This viewpoint is not universally held:
Traditionally, the United States has been an economic resource of
families in need of work. The fiscal crisis in Mexico has further height-
ened the flow of immigrants across the U.S. southern border, where
even the least desirable jobs in 1 day provide a salary comparable to a
week of work in Mexico. Whether these immigrants benefit or burden
society is a matter of dispute. At one extreme, people argue that aliens
often fill jobs that U.S. citizens do not want, and they pay taxes without
receiving benefits. The counterargument is that undocumented aliens
increase unemployment for citizens and depress wages . . . .Yet in
places like southern California, where more than one-third of the
country's immigrants currently reside, the economy depends on aliens.
An underground day-labor market flourishes, and service industries in-
creasingly look to new arrivals to fill a shrinking labor pool.'
The estimated 300,000 undocumented or illegal aliens entering the
United States each year 7 and the 6,000,000-8,000,000 already here" are
legal immigration is impossible, the 'pull' of ... unattractive jobs will continue to lure
illegal migrants into this country"). Some interesting and useful research must ap-
parently be conducted to pinpoint the jobs that American minority groups, specifically
American Blacks, claim are being taken away by undocumented aliens, since this writer
is unaware of any concrete study. It is more likely that these claims are based on
cultural resentment prompted by feelings of alienation which are large, seemingly
intractable social problems beyond the scope of the debate on immigration in general
and this Article in particular. Black Americans largely descend from "forced immi-
grants," who suffered severe legal strictures regarding freedom of movement in a form
nearly identical to those imposed later in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
on Chinese, Japanese, and other Asians.
' See Wilbur A. Finch, Jr., The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: A
Preliminary Assessment, 64 Soc. SERv. REv. 244, 245 (1990) (citations omitted).
Legal and illegal aliens were found to play an important role in several industries which
were in current or potential financial difficulties, particularly the garment industry.
Studies of the garment industry in New York and Los Angeles concluded that undocu-
mented workers did not displace U.S. workers; that the highly flexible 'immigrant
sector' of the garment industry had arisen in response to specific conditions in the New
York garment industry such as instability, volatility of demand, intense price competi-
tion, and the demand for unstandardized goods requiring a skilled labor force; and that
without the availability of female undocumented Hispanic sewing machine operators, the
Los Angeles garment industry might export jobs to other cheap labor areas.
H.R. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 99TH CONG., SER. No. 7, IMPACT OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRA-
TION AND BACKGROUND ON LEGALIZATION 3 (Comm. Print 1985) (prepared by Educ.
and Pub. Welfare Div. Cong. Research Serv., Lib. of Congress).
" See Michael E. Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, Setting the Record Straight: What Are
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particularly blamed for depressing the earnings of U.S. workers, but like
Jurgis Rudkus39 they are glad to be earning their contemporary equiva-
lent of $1.50 a day.' The government, labor unions, and other groups
have been actively campaigning against sweatshops in the garment and
other industries41 where it is primarily the undocumented alien who is
the Costs to the Public?, 52 PuB. WELFARE, Spring 1994, at 6, 7.
' See id. at 12. Fix and Passel point out that INS estimates of the undocumented
population are "somewhat over 3 million," which the authors say is grossly inaccurate,
supporting illusory ratios of disproportionate usage of public benefit programs by the
undocumented, since "there is little evidence that undocumented immigrants come to the
United States to use public benefits" and the "undocumented are barred from most
programs to begin with." Id. at 12-13. One of. their major points is that INS-mandated
screening systems like the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE)
databases used to check eligibility for certain entitlement programs, such as Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), have had little impact on saving costs of
public benefits because these programs are more highly used by citizens and aliens le-
gally residing in the United States. See id. at 13-14.
" The Jurgis Rudkus character, a non-English-speaking Lithuanian, would neither
have been "illegal" nor undocumented within the same meaning of those terms as used
today, because at the turn of the century immigration was strictly controlled through
limited ports of entry for ocean-going transport from Europe and the Asia-Pacific
region.
40
The view of undocumented migration as a "worker" flow finds strong support in the
high rates of labor force participation of both men and women, even when a highly
restrictive definition of labor force activity is used. Undocumented immigrant men
participated in the labor force at rates 4 to 12 percent higher than foreign-born men
who presumably entered the United States through authorized means, depending on time
of arrival. Among women, the participation differential by legal status was much greater,
roughly 14 percentage points for pre-1980 arrivals and 27 percentage points for later
arrivals.
George J. Bojas & Marta Tienda, The Employment and Wages of Legalized Immi-
grants, 4 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 712, 724 (1993). Differences were found among eth-
nic groups. For example, 92% of undocumented women from Africa participated in the
U.S. labor force, while 72% of undocumented women from Mexico participated in the
labor force at the time they applied for CIRCA) amnesty. See id. at 725. Legal immi-
grant status had a significant effect on U.S. workforce participation with undocumented
women from Mexico exceeding legal female immigrants from Mexico by 20% to 35%
in active U.S. labor force participation. See id.
"' See Susan Chandler, Look Who's Sweating Now: How Robert Reich Is Turning
Up the Heat on Retailers, Bus. WK., Oct. 16, 1995, at 96 ("The workforce: mostly fe-
male immigrants from Latin America and Asia who earn an average of $7.34 an hour
- just over the federal poverty line"). The hourly wage of these workers might not
seem glaringly low, until one factors in the knowledge that the jobs involve dangerous
or substandard working conditions, 10 to 12-hour days, 6 to 7 days a week, with no
health benefits. One of the motivating factors behind passage of the Immigration
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bearing the brunt of illegal conditions - glad (assuredly to a point) to be
working and frightened to complain, since she does not want to lose the
only job she might get, nor wish to bring alerted INS agents down upon
her neck.42 Ironically, some state governments actually encouraged illegal
immigration through their labor policies beckoning to temporary or
"guest" workers to fill agricultural jobs. Governor (then Senator) Pete
Wilson and his backers are faulted for having held up passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 until Congress first modi-
fied a provision affecting "guest workers," allowing 350,000 workers into
the United States to harvest crops at cheap rates and then pushed for a
measure legalizing more than one million illegal immigrants.43 "Having
put in place a job magnet and having essentially laid out a welcome mat
for illegal immigrants in the 1980s, Gov. Wilson should not be surprised
that he now has an illegal immigration problem."
Employment is not the only attraction for undocumented aliens
coming to and remaining in the United States. Most aliens who do not
have valid documentation upon U.S. entry (though arguably most are
savvy enough to procure forged papers either immediately after or prior
to entry) are from Mexico - taking advantage of the most vulnerable
gateway for simply walking - or running, driving, or flying - across
the U.S. border.4 The "undocumented others" arrive from all parts of
Reform and Control Act of 1986 was to penalize the use of undocumented labor to
push down wages; the AFLJCIO strongly supported employer sanctions in this regard.
In New York City, "'sweatshop' conditions under which illegal aliens, among others,
work in New York's 'largest industry,' the garment business - 'unseen, unheard of,
and virtually unprotected by law,"' were reported by one writer in the late 1970s to
"approach the closest thing we have in this country to a slave-labor system," with as
many as 4,500 such workplaces existing citywide, employing 50,000-70,000 workers,
and "willfully violating just about every fair-labor standard." Rinker Buck, The New
Sweatshops: A Penny for Your Collar, NEW YORK MAG., Jan. 29, 1979, at 40-46. In
1993, California Governor Pete Wilson issued an executive order creating a "Joint
Enforcement Strike Force" targeting the California underground economy where
employers violate labor laws with impunity, and sweatshops have cheated workers out
of billions of dollars in wages and the state of California out of an estimated $3
billion in uncollected income taxes. See Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable
Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103
YALE LJ. 2179, 2179-80 (1994).
42 There is a paradox in the schizophrenic dichotomy of the government as crusader
(Department of Labor) and the government as an enforcer and a feared avenger (De-
partment of Justice and the INS).
' See William J. Bennett, Immigration: Making Americans, WASH. POST, Dec. 4,
1994, at C7.
" Id.
4S Title I of IRIRA is entitled "Improvements to Border Control, Facilitation of
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the globe as guest workers who overstay, tourists who do not return,
asylees, etc. Aliens stay on in the United States beyond the permitted
period to escape destitute conditions at home and circumstances of
maltreatment unthinkable to the general U.S. populace.'
Legal Entry, and Interior Enforcement." IIRIRA, supra note 6, §§ 101-134. This title
provides for annual increases of border patrol agents of "not less than 1,000" for fiscal
years 1997-2001; 14 miles of three-tiered fencing, and improved roads for which $12
million has been budgeted; and authorizes the Attorney General to "acquire and use, for
the purpose of detection, interdiction, and reduction of illegal immigration into the
United States, any Federal equipment (including fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, four-
wheel drive vehicles, sedans, night vision goggles, night vision scopes, and sensor units)
determined available for transfer by any other agency." Id. §§ 101(a), 102(b), 102(c),
103. Other features of this Title include waiver of the Endangered Species Act and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to facilitate construction of the 14-mile
fence; machines to read "biometric identifiers"-handprints or fingerprints - of aliens
at border crossings; criminal penalties for high-speed flight from immigration check-
points; and nationwide fingerprinting of "apprehended aliens" (the "IDENT" program).
Id. §§ 102(c), 104(a), 108, 112. Review of data on "border apprehensions" may justify
the brouhaha.
Estimates of the number of undocumented Mexican entrants into the United States
are based on the crude measure of "border apprehensions." For the 11-year period
1982-92, apprehensions totalled: "1982, 828,000; 1983, 1,115,400; 1984, 1,149,800;
1985, 1,272,400; 1986, 1,705,300; . . . 1987, 1,168,900; 1988, 980,500; 1989, 906,500;
1990, 1,123,200; 1991, 1,152,700; and 1992 1,227,000 (U.S. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service, Statistical Yearbook, 1991; the figure for 1992 is an estimate extrapolat-
ed from actual apprehension data from the first 11 months of the fiscal year)."
Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Illegal Mexican Migration in the United States and U.S.
Responses, 31 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 314, 321 (1993). The writer states that IRCA's
legalization of formerly illegal entries may account for the drop in apprehensions during
1987-89, while the increase in the early 1990s might have been attributable to a larger
Border Patrol presence during that period. Id.
Foreign companies such as Nike and Levi Strauss take advantage of workers
earning $2.00 a day in Southeast Asia. Often foreign ventures are given waivers from
officially posted wage rates to attract them to cheap labor forces. When the workers
protest or try to form unions in countries such as Indonesia, they are imprisoned and
interrogated by the military. See Edward A. Gargan, Labor Unrest Arises in Developing
Asian Nations, Mar. 16, 1996, Hous. CHRON., at 1. Worse abuses abound in stories of
child laborers and forced and bonded labor. One 12-year-old Pakistani boy acclaimed
as an international hero, who had gone to testify at an international labor conference
in Sweden, later won the Reebok Youth in Action Award in Boston, and was awarded
a standing full scholarship to Brandeis University, was gunned down by an assassin
hired by the carpet industry. See Child Labor Critic Is Slain in Pakistan, N.Y. Tms,
Apr. 19, 1995, at A16. The boy "was sold by his parents at age 4 and was shackled
to a carpet loom for almost six years. When he was freed, he owed his boss 13,000
rupees. He earned one rupee a day." Id. Reebok, embarrassed by accusations that its
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Although claims are consistently made that most undocumented
aliens who enter the United States remain for utilization of social services
and public benefits,47 there has been no clear indication that this is a
proven fact.4 In fact, some studies have shown just the opposite - that
products were being manufactured in Southeast Asian sweatshops, installed a toll-free
"800 hotline" for reporting human rights abuses and sweatshops. This Morning (CBS
television broadcast, Feb. 14, 1997). Bonded labor, disguised as a method to repay
debts incurred by poor rural workers with rich and powerful landlords, despite being
statutorily outlawed, continues in Nepal and other Asia-Pacific nations. See Sherab
Posel, Kamaiya: Bonded Labor in Western Nepal, 27 COLuM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 123,
127-28 (1995).
The allegations concerning alien influx in pursuit of free public education and
health services propelled California's passage of the Proposition 187 initiative. See B.
Drunmond Ayres, Jr., California Immigration Law Is Ruled to Be Partly Illegal, N.Y.
TIMs, Nov. 21, 1995, at A10. Judge Mariana Pfaelzer ruled that the provisions of
Proposition 187 curtailing primary and secondary education and emergency medical
benefits to undocumented aliens were unconstitutional and federally preempted, but
upheld elements of the law denying post-secondary education and nonemergency
medical aid. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755
(C.D. Cal. 1995). Judge Pfaelzer tested the California law with the holding in De
Canas v. Rica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (stating in part that a "California statute pro-
hibiting an employer from knowingly employing an alien who is not entitled to lawful
residence in the United States held not preempted under federal law"), to gauge
whether the provisions in Proposition 187 were impermissible mechanisms regulating
immigration. See 908 F. Supp at 768. The judge also held, unsurprisingly, that public
education bans in the law were preempted by the holding in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 226-230, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982). 908 F. Supp. at 785. Judge Pfaelzer
upheld certain provisions of the law on the bases either that they were severable and
a valid exercise of state police power or that they already existed in another form
sanctioned by prior INS policies. Id. at 765-68, 786-87.
, These kinds of claims have frequently been made about undocumented aliens be-
cause they are voiceless, easy targets of nativist invective. Professor Gerald Neuman
states that aliens are singled out because "several factors combine to expose aliens to
governmental neglect or even hostility": (1) aliens are politically silent, since they are
not permitted to vote in state elections and the political process ignores the nonvoter,
(2) xenophobia (exaggerated fear of foreigners) and its subcategory of nativism, focus
on "otherness" which is perceived as unfamiliar and threatening; and (3) an undercur-
rent of racial, religious, or political discrimination "codes" the rationale of discussions
about aliens, giving such discourse an artificial patina of legitimacy. Gerald L. Neuman,
Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of the
Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1425, 1428-29 (1995) [hereinafter
Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws]. Other commentators point out that denying medical bene-
fits to undocumented aliens is a ridiculous notion because such individuals are high
health risks, coming as they do from regions where public health and health systems
per se are either limited or nonfunctional. See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Immigrant
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undocumented aliens are less likely to use social and medical services,
while bolstering the economy by performing low-level or poorly compen-
sated jobs and by paying taxes into a system from which they may never
reap appreciable benefit.49 California is not the only state prone to the
Bashing, 112 CHRIST. CENTURY 228-29 (1995) ("Bacteria and viruses distribute them-
selves without regard for national borders or the status of their carriers as citizens or
aliens. If an undocumented alien is carrying an infectious or contagious disease, to
leave it untreated foolishly risks spreading it to other citizens"). The article quotes
Judge Pfaelzer of the Proposition 187 case as saying, "[t]he loss of medical services
for illegal aliens could result in greater health risks for the general population." Id. at
229. "Germs do not check for green cards. The United States has serious public health
problems already in terms of very low immunization rates in many of the urban areas
where there are a high number of immigrant children." Susan B. Drake, America's
Newcomers: Health Care Issues for New Americans, in 17 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN
35, 38 (Lydio F. Tomasi ed., 1995). "HIV does not understand such concepts as cit-
izenship, alienage, national sovereignty, or geographic borders. The infection may be
transmitted to anyone, regardless of place of birth." Sana Loue & Steven Oppenheim,
Immigration and HIV Infection: A Pilot Study, 6(1) AIDS EDUC. & PREVENTON 74, 79
1994. Much of the developing world, which is the source of the majority of U.S.
immigration, is still subject to outbreaks of dangerous diseases, such as the relatively
recent epidemic of meningitis in West Africa which infected more than 100,000 people
and killed more than 10,000. See Howard W. French, Wide Epidemic of Meningitis
Fatal to 10,000 in West Africa, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1996, at Al.
49
In general .... Mexican immigrants appear to have rates of health service utilization
below those of the general U.S. population. In areas such as preventive care, dental
care, and perinatal care, the underutilization of health care may constitute a far more se-
rious problem than overutilization.
Leo R. Chavez et al., Mexican Immigrants and the Utilization of U.S. Health Services:
The Case of San Diego, 21 Soc. Scd. & MED. 93, 101 (1985).
Except for refugees and elderly immigrants, immigrants are considerably less likely than
natives to receive welfare. Among nonrefugees who came in the 1980s, only 2 percent
of working-age immigrants report welfare income, versus 3.7 percent for working-age
natives. Among longer-term immigrants of working age, 3.2 percent are on welfare -
a proportion that is still below the level of natives.
Fix & Passel, supra note 37, at 10. Fix and Passel found fault with a study favored
by immigration critics, which was prepared by Professor Donald Huddle of Rice
University that claimed immigrants cost all levels of government in 1992 a total of
$42.5 billion, while only paying $20.2 billion in taxes into the social system. Iai at 12.
Fix and Passel state Huddle made a number of errors in his calculations such as using
outdated per capita income estimates for legal immigrants, misspecifying tax rates, omit-
ting taxes paid by immigrants such as FICA, unemployment insurance, and gasoline
taxes to reach his total of taxes paid, understating the actual amount by as much as
$50 billion, while also overstating costs by $9 billion. Id. at 12-13. In contrast to
Huddle's views, Professor George Borjas estimates that immigrants pay about $85
billion annually in taxes, while only taking $24 billion in welfare payments. See
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idea that alienage places impossible burdens on its social and public
welfare systems, nor is it the only state which has decided to take
extraordinary measures dealing with what is labelled by some politicians
as an "alien threat."'
Part of the enduring American mythos is that the United States is a
haven for the dispossessed of the earth: refugees seeking freedom from
oppression, religious devotees searching for a place to practice their
faiths, ideologues espousing controversial opinions, and persons seeking
the freedom to express themselves and associate with the like-minded.
The myth also includes the gee-whiz, self-starter of humble means making
his/her way up the incline, pulling him or herself up by the veritable
Horatio Alger bootstraps of individual initiative to ultimately perch on the
pinnacle of financial and social success. There is more than a modicum
of truth in all of these images of the country, which claims to be and is
for the most part a "country of immigrants." Stories woven into the fibers
of the country's essence that provide illustration that immigration revital-
izes and strengthens the United States as a nation and economic power
stand alongside disheartening historical and contemporary evidence of
irrational reaction to noncitizens and tales of execrable depredations
George J. Borjas, Tired, Poor, on Welfare, in ARGUING IMMIGRATION, supra note 2, at
76-77. The bad news from Borjas is that if immigrants' taxes are proportionately as-
sessed in accordance with actual government expenditures, i.e., if 21% of American
taxes fund defense, 21% of immigrant taxes should fund defense, then immigrant
taxation results in an annual shortfall of $16 billion. Id. at 77. William Bennett states
that immigrants "are a huge net contributor to Social Security, and annual taxes paid
by immigrants more than offset their costs to society, generating a net annual surplus
of $25 billion to $30 billion." Bennett, supra note 43.
5 Posited on the theory that taxpayers must be protected from "the hidden costs of
illegal immigration," New Jersey State Senator Leonard T. Connors introduced a bill
denying specific benefits to aliens. "America today is confronted with an invasion of
illegal, undocumented aliens," Mr. Connors said. "Illegal, undocumented aliens are
driving American workers to the unemployment lines." Iver Peterson, Senate Votes to
Toughen Stance on Illegal Aliens, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 20, 1995, at B5. Peterson contin-
ues, "Yet the proposal to deny worker's compensation and temporary disability benefits
to illegal aliens was opposed by legislators who said that such a law might actually
encourage companies to hire aliens in the hope of avoiding having to pay such
benefits." Id. Other states have taken a path of least resistance approach to saving
money in connection with alien expenditures. Governor Pataki of New York began a
program in the summer of 1995 which makes use of a new state law deporting
"criminal aliens" under an INS-sanctioned expedited procedure. The measure, lauded by
the INS and replacing an old policy which allowed deportation only after illegal aliens
had served a minimum sentence, is supposed to save the State of New York $2 million
over the next 5 years. See Ian Fisher, Pataki Announces Aliens' Expulsion, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 1995, at Al.
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visited upon them. Placed together, these elements form the panorama that
is the backdrop to America's formulation of immigration law and the
kindred "constellation" of alien constitutional rights. Still evolving are
firm principles governing the rights of the undocumented alien, perhaps
the most "discrete and insular [of] minorities."5'
Ell. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL SKETCH OF THE RIGHTS OF AUTHORnzD
AND UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS
There were two days of that eventful year which will long be remem-
bered in San Francisco - two days when a mob of her citizens set
upon and killed unarmed, defenseless foreigners, because they were
foreigners and of another race, religion, and color, and worked for what
wages they could get. There were some public men so timid that, seeing
this, they thought that the end of the world had come; there were some
eminent statesmen, whose names I am ashamed to write here, who
began to think that the passage in the Constitution which guarantees
civil and religious liberty to every citizen or foreigner was a mistake.
But there were also some men who were not so easily frightened, and
in twenty-four hours we had things so arranged that the timid men could
wring their hands in safety, and the eminent statesmen utter their doubts
without hurting anybody or anything5 2
5' United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(offering Justice Stone's famous suggestion in "footnote 4" that there would be occa-
sions for Supreme Court review to determine "whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry").
Immigrants, of course, are an easy mark. Arguably, aliens fit the paradigm of a suspect
classification more than any other group. They are politically powerless de jure. Because
aliens have no right to vote, politicians suffer no consequences from immigrants at elec-
tion time. Historically, immigrants have suffered persistent mistreatment and injustice.
Many aliens' immigration status is immutable, at least in the immediate sense, and in
that respect their condition is beyond their own control.
These factors have led to the recognition that aliens - at least lawful permanent resi-
dent aliens - constitute a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, deserving of protection against discrimination by the states.
Such discrimination will warrant strict judicial scrutiny and can only be justified by a
policy narrowly tailored to a state's compelling interest. Aliens' 'personhood' is thus
fully vindicated, as the very language of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplates.
Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the
Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. RaV. 591, 639 (1994).
52 HARTm, supra note 1, at 228.
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The rights and privileges of immigrants and aliens under American
law have been a source of debate since the founding of the United States,
when the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were passed.53 The
Alien Act and the Sedition Act were passed partly in response to fears
that Frenchmen entering America would infect the people with radical
revolutionary ideas; the Acts were passionately condemned by Thomas
Jefferson and others. 4 The 1798 Naturalization Act, which extended
residence for naturalization purposes from five to fourteen years and
required alien registration within forty-eight hours of arrival in the United
States, was intensely unpopular and was repealed in 1802, while the Alien
Enemies Act, the last of the set, remains on the books today as 50 U.S.C.
§ 2124 (1988). 55
Except for this federal flirtation, states reigned for ninety years as
the primary immigration authorities, although federal and state officials
occasionally scuffled over aliens, and particularly slaves, as contentious
jurisdictional issues.' State laws asserted prerogatives to exclude crimi-
s See The Naturalization Act of 1798, Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566;
Alien Enemies Act, Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Alien Act, Act of June
25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570; see also Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 9, at 1881
n.309 ("The Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, was a criminal statute equally regulating
the speech of citizens and aliens, and not a regulation of migration").
' Part of the furor was caused by states complaining that Congress had no power
to control the flow of aliens into the states. See Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 9,
at 1881.
5 See id. at 1881 n.315, 1881-82.
The states regulated "movement of criminals; public health regulation; regulation
of the movement of the poor, regulation of slavery; and other policies of racial
subordination." Id. at 1841. Federal and state disputes over the regulation of slavery
and racial regulation produced particularly rancorous exchanges, which culminated in -
through these disagreements and other causes - the American Civil War. Id. at 1865-
80. Laws regulating slavery and race migration were not limited to southern states. See
id. at 1867 n.221. For laws regulating slavery and race migration to western and
midwestern states, see l. Const. of 1848, art. XV ("The general assembly shall, at its
first session under the amended constitution, pass such laws as will effectually prohibit
free persons of color from immigrating to and settling in this State; and to effectually
prevent the owners of slaves from bringing them into this State, for the purpose of
setting them free."); Ind. Const. of 1851, art. XIII, § 1 ("No negro or mulatto shall
come into, or settle in, the State, after the adoption of this Constitution); Or. Const.
of 1857, art. I, § 36 ("No free negro or mulatto, not residing in this State at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution, shall come, reside or be within this State . . . and
the Legislative Assembly shall provide by penal laws for the removal by public officers
of all such negroes and mulattoes, and for their effectual exclusion from the State, and
for the punishment of persons who shall bring them into the State, or employ or
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nals and paupers dumped by European nations; ban entry of "lunatics";
impose quarantine on ships and others entering the state; and bar free
Blacks and slaves - powers which were upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court in mid-1800 opinions Because each state had a separate scheme
for regulating immigrant flow, state regulations were ineffective, allowing
aliens to merely shop for the most hospitable port of entry to enter the
United States unchallenged." Although the Supreme Court invalidated
state head taxes on passengers in the Passenger Cases59 as an unconsti-
tutional interference with foreign commerce, the Court waited until the
mid-1870s to settle the question of immigration regulation, holding that
immigration affected the comity of nations and inherent national sover-
eignty, and thus extended the federal government's preeminence over the
area.
56
harbor them"). "Immigration lawyers will have noticed that the Oregon constitution ex-
pressly required employer sanctions. Indiana went further and wrote the employer
sanctions right into the constitution. See Ind. Const. of 1851, art. XIII, 2." See
Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 9, at 1867 n.221.
5 See id. at 1879-80.
' See id. at 1883-85. Handbooks were published in Europe advising "emigrants"
where they could land and thereby avoid exclusion. See id. at 1885.
See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876); Chy Lung v. Free-
man, 92 U.S. 275 (1876). The states did not give up easily. During the 1940s, the war
climate resulted in some states attempting to institute state identification cards to keep
tabs on foreigners or aliens within the state. Pennsylvania's law in this regard was
ruled as preempted by federal law. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73-74
(1941).
mhe supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs, including
power over immigration, naturalization, and deportation, is made clear by the Con-
stitution [and] was pointed out by authors of The Federalist in 1787 ... and has been
given continuous recognition by this Court . . . . When the national government by
treaty or statute has established rules and regulations touching the rights, privileges, ob-
ligations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the supreme law of the
land.
Id. at 62-63.
For many years Congress has provided a broad and comprehensive plan describing the
terms and conditions upon which aliens may enter this country, how they may acquire
citizenship, and the manner in which they may be deported. Numerous treaties, in return
for reciprocal promises from other governments, have pledged the solemn obligation of
this nation to the end that aliens residing in our territory shall not be singled out for
the imposition of discriminatory burdens.
Id. at 69. Soon after this opinion was written, Japanese residents in the western United
States were interned, suffering a "discriminatory burden" far more onerous than the
requirement of carrying a $1.00 state identification card. See Korematsu v. U.S. 323
U.S. 214 (1944).
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A. Early Days: The Development of Federal Immigration Law
The outlaw's life is insecure. In Bracton's day he ought not to be slain
unless he is resisting capture or fleeing from it; but it is everyone's duty
to capture him. And out in Gloucestershire and Herefordshire on the
Welsh march custom allows that he may be killed at any time. If
knowing his condition we harbour him, this is a capital crime. He is a
'lawless man' and a 'friendless man.' Of every proprietary, possessory,
contractual right he is deprived ... .1
The U.S. Constitution does not speak to immigration per se, but
gives Congress the right to regulate naturalization of citizenship.62 The
constitutional rights of aliens have been said to flow from the Fourteenth
Amendment,63 in regard to state regulation of alienage, and from the
61 See FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDRIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 476 (2d ed. 1959).
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. ("The Congress shall have Power ... [tlo
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization .... "). Insofar as constitutional protection
applies to aliens, they "do not receive the protection of constitutional guarantees that
by their terms apply only to 'citizens.' However, aliens are protected by those provi-
sions which refer to 'persons.' Thus, they receive the protection of the Bill of Rights,
including the fifth amendment due process clause, and the fourteenth amendment due
process and equal protection clauses." JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CON-
sTrrutiONAL LAw § 14.11 (4th ed. 1991).
63
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The issue has been whether or not aliens are persons
in regard to the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that the equal protection
clause is applicable to aliens). At the beginning of federal immigration law, the main
question involved the preeminence of the federal government over the states in an area
uniquely affecting U.S. sovereignty and its conduct of foreign affairs. Professor Gerald
Neuman states that federal regulation of certain aspects of immigration was initially ad-
vanced as a legal fiction.
Mhe issues of crime, poverty and disease among immigrants were treated as matters of
legitimate local concern. It was not until 1876, in Chy Lung v. Freeman, that the Su-
preme Court puffed them up into foreign policy questions. To the extent that im-
migration regulation today turns on these issues (which is substantial), the equation of
immigration with foreign policy is a fiction. That does not mean that the states should
resume their earlier responsibilities for regulating migration. There are practical reasons
[V/ol. 30:.57
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Fifth Amendment,64 in regard to federal regulation, while other sections
why immigration can be more effectively regulated by the federal government, with its
overseas diplomatic establishment and its near-exclusive authority to enter into
agreements with foreign governments. There are also reasons why the unit of govern-
ment that includes the diplomatic establishment would often be more sensitive to the
rights of aliens than would the average state. But that does not mean that an alien's de-
portation for crime is more a foreign policy question than is his execution.
Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 9, at 1897 (citations omitted). Professor Neuman
criticizes the Chy Lung opinion as "not terribly persuasive as written," posited as it
was on the assumption that federal regulation would curb abuse by state officials. "The
regulation of aliens' entry is a power subject to abuse by individual state officials. So
is every other power over aliens." Id. at 1897 n.403 (citing 92 U.S. 275, 278 (1876)).
64
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger,
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The due process aspect of the Fifth Amendment is applicable
to aliens under federal laws. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238
(1896). However, because the congressional immigration mandate does not arise from
a specific constitutional grant, but is inherent in the power of "sovereignty," Congress
has tremendous latitude to enact immigration laws which the judiciary are reluctant to
overturn. See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 'The original immigration
laws did not provide relief from deportation for an alien illegally present in the United
States." Kamlet, supra note 8, at 177-78 (citations omitted). Decisional law eventually
mitigated the fiction that deportation was non-punitive in character. See id. at 175 n.3
(citing Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) as arguing that "deportation is a severe
penalty for alien's misconduct' in the United States); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
276, 284 (1922) (stating that deportation may result in the loss "of all that makes life
worth living").
Today there are elaborate provisions whereby the Attorney General is empowered
to suspend deportation upon a requisite showing of "extreme hardship." See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(a)(1) (1988 & 1997 Supp.). There are also limited provisions for judicial review
of deportation and exclusion orders. See 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1988 & 1997 Supp.). The
1996 RIRA revises terminology in these sections replacing the term "deportation" and
its variants with the term "removal" and variants. IIRIRA, supra note 6, § 308. Addi-
tionally, the Act limits the Attorney General's power to suspend deportation under
section 244 of the INA to 4,000 suspensions annually. See id. § 309(c)(7).
Remaining on the books as evidence of the continuing sweeping federal power in
this area are provisions for indefinite detention of aliens "afflicted with.. . diseases
or mental or physical defects or disabilities" and for removal of "any alien who falls
into distress or who needs public aid from causes arising subsequent to his entry." 8
U.S.C. §§ 1222, 1260 (1988 & 1997 Supp.) The provisions were enacted as part of the
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of the Constitution have been applied to aliens with limited success. The
rights and privileges of aliens have been almost exclusively governed and
limited by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).'s These rights and
privileges have been analyzed within the framework of rights accorded
authorized aliens, i.e., resident or nonimmigrant aliens and refugees, as
opposed to undocumented aliens who, by definition, have no apparent
legally permissible basis for their presence within the borders of the
United States.
The first immigration laws unfolded during a period when America
was growing into a formidable industrial power. The young country, like
Paul Bunyan of folklore, was a mighty, strapping giant, but also pos-
sessed an oafishness and nativist xenophobia which found its way into the
country's laws and into early Supreme Court opinions dealing with aliens.
America had begun to show an intolerant streak by the middle of the
nineteenth century in the Know-Nothing and Anti-Catholic movements,
largely in response to the large influx of Irish immigrants fleeing the
poverty of a country racked by the Great Famine and other social ills.'
Following the American Civil War, the importation of foreign nationals
such as Chinese "coolies" as temporary laborers was eventually met in
original Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, c. 477, Title II.
6 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1645 (1988 & 1997 Supp.).
66
Between 1815 and 1844, an estimated 800,000 to 1,000,000 Irish responded to British
legislation and economic hardships in Ireland by sailing to North America. . . . In
1845, the Great Famine prompted the Irish to immigrate to the United States in historic
numbers .... The failure of the potato harvests resulted in approximately one million
deaths and the exodus of approximately 1.8 million Irish to North America.
Patricia I. Folan Sebben, U.S. Immigration Law, Irish Immigration and Diversity: Cead
Mile Failte (a Thousand Times Welcome)?, 6 GEo. IMMIGR. LJ. 745, 749 (1992)
(citations omitted). Although Irish labor was welcomed with open arms earlier in the
century, the growing mass of immigrants resulted in nativist reaction. "In the 1840s,
these nativists began one of the earliest movements to restrict immigration, forming
associations such as the Know-Nothing Party which advocated a twenty-one year
residence for citizenship and which opposed German and Irish Catholic immigrants." Id.
at 749-51 (citations omitted). Anti-Irish Catholic ferment had begun earlier than 1845,
as Irish populations soared in Philadelphia and Boston.
On 6 May 1844, a Protestant meeting in Kensington [in Philadelphia] provoked a riot
and bloodshed that lasted for three days and only terminated after the militia had been
mobilized. These disorders resulted in the burning of two Catholic churches .... the
destruction of dozens of Catholic homes; and sixteen deaths.
DENNIS CLARK, THE IRISH IN PHILADELPHIA 21 (1973). There is evidence that the
clashes were provoked by animosity between Irish Protestants and Catholics vying for
primacy on the city's political scene, since the Protestant power base was threatened
with replacement by the fecund Catholics. See id. at 21-23.
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California and in western mining towns with resentment and violence as
the late nineteenth century brought economic downturns.' The Chinese
Exclusion Acts, such as the one shown below, codified the xenophobia of
the period:
Act of May 6, 1882
(22 Stat. 58; 8 U.S.C.)
To Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations
Relating to Chinese
Whereas, in the opinion of the Government of the United States the
coming of Chinese laborers to this country endangers the good order of
certain localities within the territory thereof: Therefore, Be it enacted by
the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That from and after the expiration of ninety
days next after the passage of this act, and until the expiration of ten
years next after the passage of this act, the coming of Chinese laborers
to the United States be, and the same is hereby, suspended; and during
such suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese laborer to come,
or, having so come after the expiration of said ninety days, to remain
within the United States.
6 Initially the Chinese were favorably compared with the Irish and other immigrant
groups.
The New York Times argued that "John Chinaman" was a better addition to [American]
society than was "Paddy" It 'complained' that the Chinese men did not drink whiskey,
stab one another, or beat their wives. As a leading historian of the subject has
observed, "[n]eedless to say, such sarcasm was not lost on the Irish." Numerous "defen-
sive articles on behalf of the Chinese were thinly disguised attacks on the Irish."
Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15
B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 225, 231 (1995) (citations omitted). The tolerance did not last.
With the completion of the Central Pacific Railway in 1869, 12,000 Chinese laborers
were turned out in Utah, most of them finding their way back to San Francisco and
to farms in the West. See id. at 232.
The New York Times recognized that "the hapless Mongolian ... that presumptuous
individual, having faithfully served out the period for which he contracted, now wishes
to turn his skill to account by engaging in the manufacturing of goods for his own
benefit," and underselling his former bosses.
Id. at 233 (citations omitted). The marketplace turned very ugly.
In 1871, a lynch mob killed nineteen of the 172 Chinese living in "Negro Alley" in
Los Angeles .... In 1877, the Order of Caucasians attempted to bum down China-
town in San Francisco and successfully burnt down a ranch in Chico, California, also
shooting to death four Chinese farmhands .... After passage of the Chinese Exclusion
Act, white miners attacked their Chinese co-workers and killed twenty-eight in Rock
Springs, Wyoming ....
Id. at 232 n.28.
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Sec. 2. That the master of any vessel who shall knowingly bring within
the United States on such vessel, and land or permit to be landed, any
Chinese laborer, from any foreign port or place, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine
of not more than five hundred dollars for each and every such Chinese
laborer so brought, and may be also imprisoned for a term not exceed-
ing one year.
VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS
Sec. 12. That no Chinese person shall-be permitted to enter the United
States by land without producing to the proper officer of customs the
certificate in this act required of Chinese persons seeking to land from
a vessel. And any Chinese person found unlawfully within the United
States shall be caused to be removed therefrom to the country from
whence he came, by direction of the President of the United States, and
at the cost of the United States, after being brought before some justice,
judge, or commissioner of a court of the United States and found to be
one not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States.
CHINESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS EXEMPT
ADMISSION OF CHINESE TO CITIZENSHIP PROHIBITED
Sec. 14. That hereafter no State court or court of the United States shall
admit Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in conflict with this act are
hereby repealed.
Sec. 15. That the words "Chinese laborers," wherever used in this act,
shall be construed to mean both skilled and unskilled laborers and
Chinese employed in mining.'
Far from being uninvolved during this period, the U.S. Supreme
Court was an active participant in the formulation of legal principles
undergirding the first comprehensive system of federal immigration laws.
In the Chinese Exclusion Case,' the Supreme Court suggested that the
federal power to exclude aliens was inherent in the "external sovereignty
of the nation,"'7 upholding the constitutionality of laws like the one
above. Prior to that decision, Congress had passed what is considered the
- 22 Stat. 58, 8 U.S.C. (1882); amended by 23 Stat. 115, 8 U.S.C. (1884);
supplemented by 25 Stat. 504, 8 U.S.C. 270 (1888); repealed by 57 Stat. 600, 8 U.S.C.
212a (1943), reprinted in LAWS APPLICABLE TO IMMuGRATION AND NATIoNALrrY 211-
15, 218, 236, 524 (Edwina Austin Avery ed., 1953).
' Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
70 See id; see also Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 9, at 1886 n.338.
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first federal immigration statute in 1875, excluding "convicts and prosti-
tutes, as well as increasing the stringency of the 'coolie trade' stat-
utes."' Shortly thereafter, Henderson v. Mayor of New York 2 and Chy
Lung v. Freeman were decided, invalidating respective head taxes on
passengers in New York and California which the Court regarded as
excuses for state officials to improperly extort fees in return for allowing
undesirable aliens to land, and which the Court held were impermissible
disruptions of the federal regulation of commerce. 4
The 1893 opinion in the case of Fong Yue Ting v. United States7
is typical, not only of the analysis applied to contemporary alienage cases
of the period, but also the general approach the Supreme Court took
during the first ninety years of immigration law. When reviewing the
power of the executive and legislative branches to regulate the entry and
movement, and status of aliens, the Court applied an analysis which took
much the same form as that used by federal courts today. The Court was
considering the effect of a new law passed in response to a wave of
1890s migration by Chinese entrants who were circumventing the Ex-
clusion Acts passed in the 1880s, attempting to join the 100,000 or more
of their countrymen 7 already in the United States:
Chinese laborers came into the country by water and by land; they came
through the open ports, and by rivers reaching the seas, and they came
by the way of the Canadas and Mexico. New means of ingress were
discovered, and, in spite of the vigilance of the police and customs
officers, great numbers clandestinely found their way into the country.
Their resemblance to each other rendered it difficult, and often impos-
sible to prevent this evasion of the laws?7
' See id. supra note 9, at 1887 n.347 (citing the Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18
Stat. 477).
7 92 U.S. 259 (1876).
- 92 U.S. 275, 277 (1876).
74 See Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 9, at 1892-93.
We are of the opinion that this whole subject has been confided to Congress by the
Constitution; that Congress can more appropriately and with more acceptance exercise
it than any other body known to our law, state or national; that by providing a system
of laws in these matters, applicable to all ports and all vessels, a serious question,
which has long been matter of contest and complaint, may be effectually and satisfacto-
rily settled.
Henderson, 92 U.S. at 274. "In any view which we can take of this statute, it is in
conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void." Chy Lung v.
Freeman, 92 U.S. at 281.
v Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
76 Id. at 734 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 751 (Field, J., dissenting). The Court was facing the beginning of the
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The question before the Court in Fong Yue Ting was not whether the
United States had the power to exclude aliens, but whether Chinese, who
had apparently been residing lawfully in the United States, could be
arrested and deported without a trial if found without certificates of
residence authorizing their presence within U.S. borders. The case in-
volved three habeas corpus petitions brought by Chinese facing deporta-
tion: the first was by a non-English speaking Chinese who had lived in
the United States more than thirteen years before the new law was
passed, failed to get a certificate, and who was then arrested without a
wanant; the second involved a similar case where the person was arrest-
ed, brought before a district judge, and without a hearing, was ordered by
the judge to be deported "forthwith"; and in the third, the Chinese had
applied to the "collector of internal revenue" for a certificate, but was
refused because he could not produce a witness "other than a Chinaman"
to prove he was entitled to a certificate The six to three majority opin-
ion by Justice Gray reviewed the "accepted maxim of international law
that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within
its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such
conditions as it may see it fit to prescribe."'79 Justice Gray distinguished
"deportation" as the "removal of an alien out of the country simply
because his presence is deemed inconsistent with the public welfare" from
measures deemed as "punishment[s]" such as "transportation" and
"extradition."' He stated:
The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting
international relations, is vested in the political departments of the
government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and
to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so
established, except so far [as] the judicial department has been autho-
rized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the paramount law of the
Constitution, to intervene.8
erosion of the myth of America as an ethnically homogeneous nation.
78 Id. at 703. The statute required at least "one credible white witness" to testify
on the Chinese alien's behalf. Id. at 699 (section 6 of the Act of May 5, 1892, c. 60).
"' Id. at 705 (quoting Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)).
'0 Id. at 709 citing BAR, INT. LAW (Gillespie's Ed., 1883), 708 n.711. Trans-
portation is "[a] species of punishment consisting in removing the criminal from his
own country to another (usually a penal colony), there to remain in exile for a
prescribed period." BLACK'S LAW DICTnONARY 1499 (6th ed. 1990).
, Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713.
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Justice Gray noted that there had been a prior treaty with China
affecting the status of at least one of the aliens in the case which had
recognized "the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration
of... citizens and subjects.., from one country to the other"82 and
which stated "Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States,
shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and exemptions, in respect to
travel or residence, as may... be enjoyed by the citizens and subjects
of the most favored nation."83 However, Justice Gray stated that because
"Chinese laborers, of a distinct race and religion, remain[ed] strangers in
the land, resid[ed] apart by themselves, tenaciously adher[ed] to the
customs and usages of their own country, unfamiliar with our institutions,
and apparently incapable of assimilating with our people, might endanger
good order, and be injurious to the public interests,"" the United States
was constrained to amend the treaty due to "embarrassments consequent
upon such immigration"' to first limit or suspend admission of Chinese
to the United States' and then to altogether ban them." Justice Gray
upheld the arrests and deportations on the grounds that the proceeding be-
fore a U.S. district judge was "in no proper sense a trial and sentence for
a crime or offense," but simply an "ascertainment."' Gray also found
that deportation was not a punishment per se:
It is not a banishment, in the sense in which that word is often applied
to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment. It
is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien
who has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of
which the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional au-
thority, and through the proper departments, has determined that his
continuing to reside here shall depend. He has not, therefore, been
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and the
provisions of the Constitution, securing the right of trial by jury, and
Id. at 716 (citing Art. 5 of treaty between the United States and China of July
28, 1868). Justice Gray apparently took little notice of the treaty's applicability to the
alien residing in the United States prior to the act requiring the certificates of resi-
dence.
' Id. (citing Art. 6 of the treaty).
'4 Id. at 717.
' Id. (quoting the preamble of a supplemental treaty of November 17, 1880
concluded between the United States and China).
Id. (citing Art. 1 of the 1880 treaty).
"' Id. at 718-30.
Is Id. at 730.
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prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel and unusual
punishments, have no application."
Whether the statute was penal in nature, since it included in addition
to its other stringent provisions a directive to imprison Chinese at "hard
labor at a period of not exceeding one year," was an aspect of the case
Justice Gray apparently chose not to address.
Three of the other justices looked closely at the statute and found it
to be punitive, dissenting from the majority - two of them vigorously -
on the grounds that the statute denied both equal protection and due
process to the affected aliens. Chief Justice Fuller "entertain[ed] no doubt
that the provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which forbid
that any person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law'' were "universal in their application to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of
race, or color, or of nationality." He stated that the act imposed "a
legislative sentence of banishment, and, as such, [was] absolutely void."
Justice Brewer noted that the Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins' had
held that the use of the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment
applied equally to "all individuals lawfully within the State"5 and that
the Fifth Amendment "must be equally comprehensive."' He compared
the Chinese laborers affected to "ticket-of-leave men," referring to the fact
that the laborers had to carry a certificate of residence at all times or risk
arrest in a fashion similar to that of Australian convicts.' Justice Brewer
expressed discomfort over using sovereignty as a justification for impos-
ing the hardship of deportation on Chinese laborers, who were "denizens,"
invited to work in the United States on railroads and public works:
They have been told that if they would come here they would be treated
just the same as we treat an Englishman, an Irishman, or a Frenchman.
They have been invited here, and their position is much stronger than
that of an alien, in regard to whom there is no guaranty from the
government, and who has come not in response to any invitation, but
89 Id.
' Id. at 726 (describing section 4 of the Act of May 5, 1892, c. 60).
9' Id. at 761 (Fuller, Ch. J., dissenting).
' Id. at 761-62 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
9 Id. at 763.
94 118 U.S. 356, 369-71 (invalidating a California municipal ordinance discriminating
against Chinese laundry owners).
9' Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 739 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
% Id.
9 Id. at 743.
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has simply drifted here because there is no prohibition to keep him
ou 98
It is said that the power here asserted is inherent in sovereignty. This
doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite and
dangerous. Where are the limits to such powers to be found, and by
whom are they to be pronounced? Is it within legislative capacity to
declare the limits? If so, then the mere assertion of an inherent power
creates it, and despotism exists. May the courts establish the boundaries?
Whence do they obtain the authority for this? Shall they look to the
practices of other nations to ascertain the limits? The governments of
other nations have elastic powers - ours are fixed and bounded by a
written constitution."
Justice Field distinguished the Chinese Exclusion Case, which
excluded foreigners from the United States, from the case under review,
in which an ex post facto burden was being imposed on previously legal
aliens."° He stated, comparing the two circumstances: "[B]etween legis-
lation for the exclusion of Chinese persons, that is to prevent them from
entering the country, and legislation for the deportation of those who have
acquired a residence in the country under a treaty with China, there is a
wide and essential difference..'. 1  Justice Field stated that the
government's "power to deport from the country persons lawfully. domi-
ciled therein by its consent, and engaged in the ordinary pursuits of life,
has never been asserted by the legislative or executive departments,
except for a crime, or as an act of war."" 2 Distinguishing between
"alien enemies and alien friends,"' 3 Justice Field declared that to hold
the Chinese laborers to a different set of laws or to categorize them as
less protected than other persons was to "ignore the teachings of our
history, the practice of our government, and the language of our Constitu-
tion."'" Calling the conception that the power to summarily arrest and
deport aliens was coterminous with the power to exclude them "shocking
brutality"'"5 and comparing the government policy to the expulsion of
93 Id. at 736-37.
9 Id. at 737.
,® Id. at 749-51 (Field, J., dissenting).
1o1 Id. at 746.
" Id. at 746-47 (referring to the Alien Act of 1789 as being an exception, Justice
Field argues that the act was "severely denounced by many of [the country's] ablest
statesmen and jurists as unconstitutional and barbarous").
203 Id. at 749.
204 Id. at 754.
205 Id. at 756.
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Moors from Spain, Jews from England and Russia, and Huguenots from
France,"° Justice Field opined:
The punishment is beyond all reason in its severity. It is out of propor-
tion to the alleged offense. It is cruel and unusual. As to its cruelty,
nothing can exceed a forcible deportation from a country of one's
residence, and the breaking up of all relations of friendship, family, and
business there contracted. The laborer may be seized at a distance from
his home, his family, and his business, and taken before the judge for
his condemnation, without permission to his home, see his family, or
complete any unfinished business. Mr. Madison well pictures its charac-
ter in his powerful denunciation of the alien law of 1798 ... and con-
cludes ... that if a banishment of the sort described is not a pun-
ishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to
imagine a doom to which the name can be applied."°
The protestations of the dissent in the Fong Yue Ting case to the
contrary, the immigration policy of the United States during the last part
of the nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth centuries continued
to be racially exclusionary:
Americans' antipathy toward the Chinese ultimately extended to almost
everyone indigenous to the Asian continent. In 1907, the United States
and Japan negotiated a "Gentlemen's Agreement" that limited the right
of Japanese nationals to settle in this country. By 1917, Congress had
excluded virtually every resident of the so-called "Asiatic barred zone,"
a vast territory that extended from the Kirghiz (Russian) Steppes and
Arabian Peninsula to what is now Indonesia."°
Supreme Court decisions such as the Japanese Immigrant Case, "which
held that any procedure to deport aliens who are in the United States
must conform to the requirements of due process,"'" gave aliens the
106 Id. at 757.
117 Id. at 759-60 (explaining that the law was a punishment, Justice Field also
considered it an unconstitutional infringement of rights under the Fourth Amendment).
' HULL, supra note 8, at 11 (citations omitted).
During this time members of Congress also attempted to prevent blacks from immi-
grating to the United States. In 1915 an amendment was introduced in the Senate to
exclude "all members of the African or black race." The amendment was approved, but
subsequently defeated in the House of Representatives after an intense campaign by the
NAACP.
Id. at 11 n.25. "The only territory excluded from the [Asiatic] barred zone included
parts of Afghanistan and Russia, and what was then Persia." U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, THE TARNIsHED GOLDEN DOOR, in IMMIGRATION, 9 (1980) [hereinafter
GOLDEN DOOR].
109 CARLINER ET AL., supra note 15, at xiii n.13 (citing Yamataya v. Fisher, 189
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occasional victory, but overall federal government policy on immigration
remained highly restrictive.
Immigration law continued to evolve during the first quarter of the
twentieth century. By that time, waves of immigrants were coming to
America from Italy, Poland, Greece, and many other countries, particular-
ly from the Mediterranean region. Mechanisms of paranoia began clanking
again as xenophobes warned of a rising tide of foreigners who would
engulf native-born Americans. Nostalgia for a bygone era and an ugly
anti-foreigner movement swept the country, stimulating isolationism and
politics of ethnic exclusion excited by the alarums of pseudo-scientists
who warned of a threat from Jews, Italians, and other "'beaten men from
beaten races, representing the worst failures in the struggle for
existence'."'. 0 Respected social and literary figures joined in the nativist
sentiment. In 1907, Henry James wrote in The American Scene of the
new immigrant: "He resembles for the time the dog who sniffs around
the freshly acquired bone, giving it a push and a lick. Let not the un-
wary, therefore, visit Ellis Island.... The 1911 Dillingham Commission,
commissioned by Congress, released a forty-two volume study on the
impact of immigration in U.S. society, which provided "irrefutable proof
that the new immigrants were of inferior stock. The Commission, there-
fore, concluded that American society would be inexorably debased unless
migration from Southern and Eastern Europe was substantially cur-
tailed."" '2 As a result, Congress enacted the Immigration Act of
1917,"' which remained in effect until 1952 and "banned not only
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903)).
110 HuLL, supra note 8, at 14, 14 n.50 (citing Jenna Weissman Joselit, Perceptions
and Reality of Immigrant Health Care, 1840-1920, 178 (1980) (paper prepared for
SCIRP Staff Report) (quoting respected early twentieth-century academician Edward
Ross)). The theories were the American brand of a worldwide phenomenon which later
gave rise to Nazi ideas about genetic purity. See id.
"' See Nicolaus Mills, Introduction: The Era of the Golden Venture, in ARGUING
IMMIGRATION, supra note 2, at 25.
112 See HULL, supra note 8, at 15 (citations omitted). Fueled by the saber-rattling of
Imperial Germany, a rash of anti-German sentiment began to sweep the country.
[Miany flourishing newspapers, social clubs, and other enterprises serving the German-
American community were forced to close. The Governor of Iowa prohibited the use of
any language other than English in public places and over the telephone, sauerkraut was
renamed "liberty cabbage," and the demand for dachshund pups fell in one year by 60
percent.
Id. at 15-16 (citations omitted). As America was drawn into the maelstrom of the First
World War, the movement reached a fever pitch - a phenomenon holding some irony,
since 20 years later Germans under Nazi rule proved themselves paradigmatic ethnic
purists.
113 Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 374-375.
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illiterates and virtually every inhabitant of Asia, but also several other
categories of aliens as well," such as persons attempting to enter the
United States for immoral purposes, persons of "constitutional psychopath-
ic inferiority," and vagrants. 14 Meanwhile, during this period, the Su-
preme Court issued a decision invalidating an Arizona statute that re-
quired eighty percent of employees in businesses having more than five
employees to be "qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United
States,"' . 5 but upheld a statute which limited public works employment
to U.S. citizens, giving a preference to state citizens,1 6 and upheld a
later law which denied licenses to operate pool and billiard rooms on the
ground that it was not irrational to bar aliens from the "conduct of a
dubious business."
'' 7
'"The flood of immigrants after World War I, sixty-five percent of
whom were from eastern and southern Europe, heightened the tensions
between old and new immigrants."".. The evolving national policy on
immigration, influenced by the larger social movement, ultimately resulted
in the push for construction of an immigration framework based on
preferential quotas. In response, in 1921 Congress passed and President
Harding signed into law a bill designed to reclaim "America for Ameri-
cans."
119
This measure, the First National Origins Act, ... established a
ceiling on European immigration and limited the number of annual visas
allocated to any one country to 3 percent of its foreign-born population
in the United States at the time of the 1910 census. This formula still
allowed more southern and eastern Europeans to enter than its framers
had intended, however. To rectify the situation Congress subsequently
passed an amended version known as the Johnson-Reed, or second
"National Origins," Act, which went into effect in 1929 and remained
the gravamen of United States immigration law until 1965."2
The second National Origins Act... was a finely tuned contriv-
ance designed to restore an "optimal" ethnic mix: Under its terms, Great
Britain, with 2 percent of the world's population, received 43 percent of
"4 See HULL, supra note 8, at 16, 163 n.57.
See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 34 (1915).
1,6 See Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 195 (1915).
"7 See Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927).
"' See Bean & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 68.
... See HULL, supra note 8, at 17-18.
'" See id. at 18, 163 n.65 (citations omitted) (citing Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190,
43 Stat. 153).
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the quota; most Asians continued to be barred altogether, and the al-
lotment for southern and eastern Europeans was significantly slashed.'2 '
"In establishing immigration restrictions in 1924, Congress rejected
a proposal to set quotas on the basis of the number of foreign-born
persons of various nationalities residing in the United States in 1910 in
favor of quotas based on the national origins of the entire population in
1920.""' The result was that the former plan would have allocated forty-
four percent of total immigration to southern and eastern Europeans,
while the use of the 1920 census gave only fifteen percent of the alloca-
tion to those groups."
These policies gave rise to one of the most horrific results in
American legal history. The National Origins Act, which never performed
with "fool-proof efficiency," was sufficiently effective to exclude hundreds
of thousands of people attempting to escape Hitler's SS exterminators.2 4
"In what a congressional staff report referred to as perhaps the cruelest
action in United States history, in 1939 Congress also defeated a proposal
to rescue some 20,000 children from Nazi persecution, despite the eager-
ness of American families to sponsor them. The reason: the children
would have exceeded the annual quota allotted to Germany.""l
After the Second World War, thoughtful people, appalled by the conse-
quences of their country's immigration policies, began agitating for their
revision. The quota system nevertheless basically remained intact for
another twenty years, although Congress frequently circumvented it by
passing special legislation that resulted in the admission of hundreds of
thousands of mainly "new" immigrants - war brides, displaced persons
who had escaped Hitler's death camps, and later, refugees fleeing
communism. To secure the integrity of the national origin system,
however, Congress charged these special interests against their countries'
future quotas. 2
During the 1920s-1940s, the Supreme Court was relatively silent on
the question of alien constitutional rights with two notable exceptions -
both dealing with Japanese - which set the tone for a more progressive
approach to constitutional analysis of the rights of aliens. The first case
,2 See id. at 18 (citation omitted).
' See Bean & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 68.
2 See id.
224 See HULL, supra note 8, at 18-19 (citations omitted).
'5 See id. at 19 (citations omitted).
' See id. (citations omitted).
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was Korematsu v. United States,27 where the Supreme Court upheld an
executive military exclusion order" forbidding persons of Japanese
ancestry from the West Coast war area, "selected as suspect because of
their race, and deprived of any due process despite the lack of even a
single case of disloyal conduct."'29 Although the Court upheld the tem-
porary exclusion and detention of persons of Japanese ancestry, giving
great deference to the war powers of President Roosevelt and Congress,
the six to three majority opinion by Justice Black established a new
standard of review for race classifications, which would have a significant
effect on the development of the rights of aliens:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is
not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial
antagonism never can. 3'
The second case, Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,' in-
volved a Japanese resident alien who was ineligible under the laws of the
time for citizenship and who, following World War I, found that he was
unable to renew the fishing license he had possessed for twenty-five
years. Takahashi was denied the license because of a new provision in
California law which forbid the licensing of persons ineligible for citizen-
ship, which the Supreme Court of California upheld on the basis of the
state's proprietary right in the fish.' The U.S. Supreme Court, on the
basis of Fourteenth Amendment analysis, struck down the statute stating
"[t]o whatever extent the fish in the three-mile belt off California may be
'capable of ownership' by California, we think that 'ownership' is inade-
quate to justify California in excluding any or all aliens who are lawful
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Executive Order 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 17, 1942). Congress then enacted
a law which it made it a federal crime to violate military orders pursuant to this
authority. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 62, § 14.8(d)(1), at 621.
' 9 See Wu, supra note 67, at 233 (citations omitted). Justice Murphy, in his dissent,
stated that the detentions and intermnents of Japanese-Americans represented "the ugly
abyss of racism" and that the measure was "one of the most sweeping and complete
deprivations of constitutional rights in the history of this nation." Korematsu, 323 U.S.
at 233, 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
'3 323 U.S. at 216.
... Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 185 P.2d 805 (1947), rev'd and rem'd,
334 U.S. 410 (1948).
132 Id.
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residents of the State from making a living by fishing in the ocean off its
shore while permitting all others to do so.' 33
In the meantime, as small victories for aliens in the constitutional
arena mounted, the early 1950s Congress, in an atmosphere of concern
over potential entry into the United States of "fifth columnists" and
communist provocateurs, contemplated a major immigration law effort,
which resulted in passage of the statute that remains the basic framework
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (NA). "The McCarran-Walter Act
of 1952, the basic law in effect today, codified the immigration law under
a single statute.'13 The Act established three principles for immigration
policy: "(1) the reunification of families, (2) the protection of the domes-
tic labor force, and (3) the immigration of persons with needed
skills."135 The concepts of the national origins system and unrestricted
immigration from European and Western Hemisphere countries was
retained, but bars were removed to immigration and citizenship for races
which had been denied status prior to that time. "Asian countries, never-
theless, were still discriminated against, for prospective immigrants whose
ancestry was one-half of any Far Eastern race were chargeable to minimal
quotas for that nation, regardless of the birthplace of the immigrant."'36
The McCarran-Walter Act "ranks among the country's most controversial
policies, and with the exception of the Internal Revenue Code represents
the longest, most complicated, and certainly the most arcane piece of
legislation in modem United States history."'37
The Supreme Court, often a weathervane of the social climate, issued
several opinions during the period which echoed the decade of the Korean
War and McCarthyism. In one case, Marcello v. Bonds,' an alien,
Marcello, had come to the United States as an infant in 1908, married a
U.S. citizen, and was jailed for one year for violation of the Marijuana
Tax Act.3 9 Following the 1952 amendment of the INA, which ex post
facto made a marijuana conviction grounds for expulsion, the Immigration
Service initiated deportation proceedings against Marcello and ordered him
to leave the country in sixty days, a determination upheld by the Supreme
Court.Y4
3 Id. at 421.
3 GOLDEN DooR, supra note 108, at 7-12.
135 See id.
136 See id.
" See HULL, supra note 8, at 20 (citation omitted).
13& 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
' See HULL, supra note 8, at 33.
" See id. Marcello, however, never left the United States because no country would
take him. See id. at 34 n.29.
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In another decision, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
termed by Professor Gerald Neuman as indicative of the "anomalies, and
even barbarities, that would be tolerated in no other field of regula-
tion,''. the Supreme Court held that a returning resident alien could be
excluded and incarcerated forever on Ellis Island without notice or
hearing if no other country would take him." Mezei, who had lived in
the United States lawfully for twenty-five years, had attempted to return
to Hungary to visit his dying mother.43 On his return, armed with a
visa from the American consulate, Mezei was denied entry by the Attor-
ney General on the "basis of information of a confidential nature, the
disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest.' ' " The
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Clark, reversed the courts below
and upheld Mezei's exclusion without a hearing as constitutional: "It is
true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally,
may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional stan-
dards of fairness encompassed in due process of law .... But an alien
on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing: 'Whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned."' 45
A third case from the period exemplifying the limited due process
protection for aliens was that of Galvan v. Press." Galvan had lived in
the United States since 1918, joining the Communist party in 1944 for a
two-year period, an act which was legal at the time, since the party had
'4' See Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 9, at 1839 (citations omitted).
' Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215-216 (1953). The
District Court had admitted Mezei as a parolee temporarily on a $5,000 bond; the
Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 207-08.
"4 Id. at 208.
'" Id. at 208. Justice Clark described Mezei's plight:
That determination rested on a finding that respondent's entry would be prejudicial to
the public interest for security reasons. But thus far all attempts to effect respondent's
departure have failed: Twice he shipped out to return whence he came; France and
Great Britain refused him permission to land. The State Department has unsuccessfully
negotiated with Hungary for his readmission. Respondent personally applied for entry to
about a dozen Latin American countries but all turned him down. So in June 1951
respondent advised the Immigration and Naturalization Service that he would exert no
further efforts to depart. In short, respondent sat on Ellis Island because this country
shut him out and others were unwilling to take him in.
Id. at 208-09.
" Id. at 212 (citations omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950), upholding the exclusion of a war bride).
'4 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (holding substantive immigration policy is not constrained
by due process).
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legalized status and had even sponsored candidates for state elections.'47
Galvan was a member of the Communist party during the effective period
of the Alien Registration Act of 1940, which provided "that no alien
could be deported for subversion without proof that he or she actually
advocated the overthrow of the government."" This provision was
nullified by passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950' 4" which made
it a deportable offense to have been a member of the Communist party
at any time." A majority on the Supreme Court concluded that mem-
bership for two years in the Communist party was adequate grounds
under the INA for deportation. The Court issued its opinion regretfully,
but followed a doctrine it still has not abandoned today that "since
deportation proceedings are civil in nature the government can according-
ly penalize aliens for activity that was not unlawful when committed."''
As Justice Frankfurter stated for the majority in Galvan v. Press:
[Miuch could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean slate,
that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political discretion
heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress in regulating the entry
and deportation of aliens. And since the intrinsic consequences of
deportation are so close to punishment for crime, it might fairly be said
also that the ex post facto Clause, even though applicable only to
punitive legislation, should be applied to deportation.
But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of Congress
under review, there is not merely a "page of history," but a whole
volume. Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to
remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of
government. In the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch
of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due
process. But that the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusive-
ly to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative
and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government.
And whatever might have been said at an earlier date for applying the
ex post facto Clause, it has been the unbroken rule of this Court that it
has no application to deportation. We are not prepared to deem our-
selves wiser or more sensitive to human rights than our predeces-
sors .... 152
" See HULL, supra note 8, at 34.
', Id. (citations omitted).
' Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 22, 64 Stat. 1006.
'5 See HULL, supra note 8, at 34.
151 See id.
1- 347 U.S. at 530-32 (citations omitted). Today, however, "federal judges often
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Perturbed by the unfairness and arbitrariness of the immigration
quota system, President John Kennedy and others vowed to abolish it.
"On the domestic level, members of the emergent civil rights movement
became particularly active in this endeavor, as did affiliates of church,
ethnic, and civic organizations, whose postwar efforts on behalf of
refugees had sensitized them to the inequities inherent in the country's
immigration scheme.' ' 5  Thus, twenty-three months after President
Kennedy's assassination, in a fitting eulogy, President Lyndon Johnson
signed the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 into
law at the foot of the Statue of Liberty, ending a system, he said, which
"ha[d] been un-American in the highest sense."'54
The new legislation significantly reduced the flagrant racial and ethnic
discrimination that had characterized earlier acts, but some aspiring
immigrants were still treated inequitably: Colonies and dependencies
were allocated only 200 visas a year - to be counted against both the
mother country and its hemispheric ceiling .... The result has been to
restrict dramatically immigration from certain colonial areas, where
demand for entrance is high and where the population is mainly Black
and Asian .... Under the 1965 act many western hemisphere countries
also fared badly because their residents, accustomed to unlimited migra-
tion, were now restricted to an annual ceiling of 120,000. Within this
ceiling, applicants were granted visas on a "first come-first serve" basis
- a system that soon provoked criticism from many members of Con-
gress, either because entrants from certain countries, particularly Mexico,
could immigrate to the United States in what they considered inordinate
numbers, or because the new policy extended no favoritism to those
with needed skills or family ties to United States residents .... "
labor creatively to mute [the] harsh impact" of deportation laws. HULL, supra note 8,
at 35.
On occasion they will even stretch facts, contort phraseology, or impute intentions to
Congress that belie common sense. In 1957, for instance, the Court asserted in Rowoldt
v. Perfetto [355 U.S. 115 (1957)] that Congress intended only to deport those aliens
whose membership in the Communist party had been "meaningful," and six years later
it concluded in Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy [374 U.S. 469 (1963)] that the govern-
ment bears the burden of proving its "meaningfulness."
Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
m See HULL, supra note 8, at 22.
' Id. (citations omitted) (citing Weekly Compendium of Presidential Documents, no.
11, Monday, Oct. 11, 1965, at 365).
55 See id. at 23, 25 (citations omitted). Congress passed several amendments in the
1970s providing for a worldwide ceiling on inunigrant admissions, finally settling on
a ceiling of 270,000 nonrefugee immigrants in 1980. See id. at 25.
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B. Modern Constitutional Rights of Legal and Undocumented
Aliens
"Illegal alien" gestures toward a legal concept of noncompliance with
law, but the law is more complex than most politicians and voters
realize. There are different manners in which an alien's presence could
be said to violate the law .... and there are different forms of curative
government action that may impart degrees of legality to the alien's
presence .... Many aliens enter or overstay for the purpose of work-
ing in the United States, but others act from a variety of motives: some
seek asylum from persecution; some flee threats of death or injury that
do not count as persecution under the asylum laws; some enter unlaw-
fully while awaiting lawful admittance as a family member or a citizen
or permanent resident. Some alien women are kept in unlawful status by
husbands who could confer lawful status upon them but refuse for* the
purpose of maintaining control .... Some "illegal" aliens entered the
United States as young children without exercising any choice .... "
The 1970s might be called the "golden age" of alien constitutional
rights - especially when one looks back at the period with present-day
awareness that contemporary public attitude is shifting away from toler-
ance to the old notions of restrictionism. During the early 1970s to early
1980s - a little more than a decade in time - alien rights which had
slowly inched forward over a period of almost one hundred years bound-
ed ahead in a great leap, particularly expanding alien franchise in the area
of equal protection, while to a very limited extent providing protection to
the undocumented. A number of important decisions were handed down
by the Supreme Court during this period - some of which perpetuated
the restrictive interpretations found in earlier cases - but there were two
decisions which stand out as pertinent to the protection of the rights of
undocumented aliens: Graham v. Richardson'"7 and Plyler v. Doe. '58
The Graham case was a watershed victory in the realm of general
constitutional rights of aliens. In that case, the Court held that the equal
protection clause prevented a state from conditioning welfare benefits
either upon the possession of United States citizenship or residence in the
United States for a specified number of years."9 The Court, although
noting its prior decisions had accepted the justification of a "special
'5 See Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws, supra note 48, at 1440-41 (citations omitted).
" 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
... 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
'-9 403 U.S. at 382-83.
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public interest" in allowing a state to favor its own citizens over aliens in
distributing public benefits, stated that the decision in Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Commission"W had "cast doubt on the continuing validity of
the special public-interest doctrine in all contexts.'' The Court contin-
ued: "Whatever may be the contemporary vitality of the special public-
interest doctrine in other contexts after Takahashi, we conclude that a
state's desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its own citizens is
inadequate to justify Pennsylvania's making noncitizens ineligible for
public assistance, and Arizona's restricting benefits to citizens and long
time resident aliens."6
The Court in Graham pointed out "that prior decisions had equated
classifications based on alienage with those based on race or national
origin and declared that such classifications are inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny. The classification would only be valid
if it was necessary to promote a compelling state interest."'6 The Court
also held that because only Congress has the power to set policies barring
indigent aliens from the United States, state action in this area is super-
seded by the federal power to regulate immigration, finding "state laws
that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of
their alienage conflict with these overriding national policies in an area
constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government. '""M Two Supreme
Court opinions following Graham, Application of Griffiths"6  and
Sugarman v. Dougall,'6 used the suspect classification argument and
compelling state interest language to invalidate respectively a state
citizenship requirement for admission to the bar and a citizenship require-
ment for eligibility for any position in the competitive class of a state's
civil service system. These cases were later narrowed by decisions
holding that there was a "self-governance" or "political function" jus-
tification which operated as an exception to strict scrutiny in laws exclud-
ing aliens as members of a state police force, 67 as public school teach-
ers,168 or as state "peace officers."'69
'6 Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 410.
261 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 62, § 14.12(c), at 707.
262 403 U.S. at 374.
" See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 62, § 14.12(c), at 707.
'64 403 U.S. at 378.
A congressional enactment construed so as to permit state legislatures to adopt divergent
laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for federally supported programs would
appear to contravene [the] explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity.
Id. at 382.
265 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
413 U.S. 634 (1973).
267 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
268 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
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Plyler v. Doe7' marked a beachhead for the rights of the undocu-
mented alien. The Court opinion of Justice Brennan in Plyler was - and
remains - controversial"' since it extended the right to a public educa-
tion to the children of individuals who might have little or no legal basis
for presence in the United States. The Plyler ruling itself was a very
limited one. Justice Brennan used the literal language in the Fourteenth
Amendment, providing protection to "any person within [state] jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws," to analyze the plight of children under
a Texas statute which denied state funds for educating children not
"legally admitted" to the United States and denied the enrollment of
children not "legally admitted" in Texas public schools. The Court
refused to recognize undocumented aliens as a suspect class, which would
have required laws burdening the class to be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny," stating that all laws burdening illegal aliens did not require
judicial review, because the status of being an undocumented alien was
not "an absolutely immutable characteristic since it is the product of
conscious, indeed unlawful, action."'73
The Court's review specifically focused on the hardship that would
be endured by the children of undocumented aliens, finding that the state
was not entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality for a law
which would impose "a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children
not accountable for their disabling status."' 4 In finding that education
is not a right granted specifically by the U.S. Constitution, nor held to be
a fundamental right under Supreme Court decisional law," the Court
avoided use of strict scrutiny analysis and the requirement that the law be
necessary to a compelling state interest, instead using a kind of
heightened rational review, undergirded by normative notions of jus-
tice. 76 The result: "[e]ven if the state found it expedient to control the
' Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
"" 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
171
Brennan never explained how the denial of schooling to a child differs from the denial
of other governmental benefits to an undocumented parent, upon whose income and
well-being the child's welfare ultimately depends. The Court has always permitted the
government to deny illegal parents access to the private employment and public benefits
that provide the children's essential economic support, arguably harming the children
(who may actually be U.S. citizens) even more grievously.
Schuck, supra note 10, at 87.
'7 457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
SId. at 218-22.
'74 Id. at 223.
'75 Id. at 218-22.
171 Id. at 222-24.
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conduct of adults by action against their children, legislation directing the
onus of a parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with
fundamental conceptions of justice."' "r "[Tihe importance of education
to a person's ability to function in society, and the fact that denial of all
educational benefits to these children would result in their being deprived
of any opportunity to advance their personal or economic interests on the
basis of individual merit, led the majority to the conclusion that the Court
should not simply defer to the state decision to deny an education to
these children."''
Plyler was a close five-to-four decision. Chief Justice Burger
authored a dissent joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
"Once it is conceded - as the court does - that illegal aliens are not a
suspect class, and that education is not a fundamental right, our inquiry
should focus on and be limited to whether the legislative classification at
issue bears a rational relationship to a legitimate purpose."'79
In the view of the dissent it was not unconstitutional to deny any
opportunity for an education to these children because it was not
irrational for a state to conclude that it did not have the responsibility
to provide benefits for persons whose presence in the country was
illegal.
The closeness of the vote in Plyler and the narrowness of the ruling,
striking down only a law which denied an education to the children of
illegal aliens, make it difficult to predict the nature of the equal protec-
tion guarantee that will be defined in future cases involving the rights
of illegal aliens.'
As the 1980s continued, drawing toward the 1990s, the debate about
undocumented aliens became a centerpiece political exchange, providing
a political litmus test for both the left and right, particularly in the
southwestern United States as undocumented alien entry rose at a rapid
rate. Although accumulating sparse legal victories in federal courts, such
as the right to coverage by the National Labor Relations Act,' the
'7 Id. at 219, 220.
" See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 62, § 14.13, at 717.
' 475 U.S. at 248 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 62, § 14.13, at 718 (citations omitted).
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (holding that an employer
committed an unfair labor practice when it reported undocumented alien employees to
the INS in retaliation for their participation in union activities). For a similar develop-
ment in this area, see also Saipan Hotel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 114
F.3d (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that NLRB has jurisdiction over both resident and
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general legal trend remained against the undocumented alien, particularly
where attempts were made to expand his/her rights under federal laws.
These rights were limited by earlier decisions, such as the 1976 Matthews
v. Diaz"8 case affecting all aliens, where the Supreme Court held that
Congress could condition participation in a program for federal medical
benefits on continuous five-year residence in the United States; the Court
claimed that the provision was being upheld for, among other reasons, its
effect on the conduct of foreign relations, since aliens are noncitizens,
still retaining benefits of citizenship from some other country. In repre-
sentative mid-1980s cases following Plyler, the Supreme Court, in one
instance, refused to review the constitutionality of INS procedures affect-
ing Haitian parole applicants, remanding the case to the district court to
determine whether the INS properly exercised its discretion without regard
to race or national origin," and in another case held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures had no
extraterritorial effect for a Mexican alien apprehended in the United
States, whose Mexican domiciles were searched by Mexican authorities at
the request of U.S. law enforcement officials.'84
IV. THE RECENT LEGAL DEBATE ON UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS
Although the legal immigrants who entered in recent years constituted
only 3.1% of the total U.S. population during the 1980s (the comparable
shares for the first three decades of this century were 10.4%, 5.7%, and
3.5% respectively), the steady accumulation of immigrants over time has
produced a growing cohort of foreign-born in the United States. In
1994, over 22 million people, 8.7% of the total U.S. population, were
foreign-born. Although the percentage of the foreign-born remains far
below the 13.2% share it comprised in 1920, it is the highest percentage
since then, and the foreign-born share has almost doubled since 1970,
when it was 4.8%. The fact that one out of every eleven persons in the
United States is a first-generation immigrant gives immigration a much
higher political and media profile today than it possessed only a quarter-
century ago, when fewer than one in twenty were foreign-born.' 5
nonresident workers in the U.S. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands).
,8 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
' Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 857 (1985).
'4 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, reh'g denied, 494 U.S. 1092
(1990).
"' See Peter H. Schuck, Alien Runination, 105 YALE LJ., 1963, 1973-74 (1996)
(reviewing PEmER BRMEow, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERIcA's
IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995)).
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Sec. 330. PRISONER TRANSFER TREATIES.
(a) NEGOTIATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. - (1) Congress
advises the President to begin to negotiate and renegotiate, not later
than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, bilateral prisoner
transfer treaties, providing for the incarceration, in the country of the
alien's nationality, of any alien who -
(A) is a national of a country that is party to such a treaty; and
(B) has been convicted of a criminal offense under Federal or State law
and who - (i) is not in lawful immigration status in the United States,
or (ii) on the basis of conviction for a criminal offense under Federal
or State law, or on any other basis, is subject to deportation or removal
under the Immigration and Nationality Act, for the duration of the
prison term to which the alien was sentenced for the offense referred to
in subparagraph (B) ....
(c) PRISONER CONSENT. - Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, except as required by treaty, the transfer of an alien from a
Federal, State, or local incarceration facility under an agreement of the
type referred to in subsection (a) shall not require consent of the alien
186
The Irish began to go to America the moment the door was opened
.... So that America has always been a friend to the Irish people.
And when I went over there - I never felt as if I were a foreigner at
all.
Sean O'Casey, Wisdom"m
If Sean O'Casey were to come to the America of 1997, he might
find that the door is rapidly closing for all immigrants, especially those
deriving from some of the more economically disadvantaged regions of
the world community. There is a markedly different attitude building
toward immigrants, particularly the underskilled or uneducated, or those
who may - in certain areas of the United States - tend to exhibit
distinctively "foreign" characteristics. 8 Public pressure has resulted in
" IIRIRA, supra note 6, § 330.
'17 EDWARD F. MuRPHY, THE CRowN TREAsURY oF RELEVANT QUOTATIONS 383
(1978).
I88
Immigration is most plausibly restricted when the immigrant is attracted by higher wel-
fare benefits in the immigration state. Such immigration can be expected to impose
costs on natives without generating an efficiency gain. An efficient immigration policy
will therefore seek to exclude such value-decreasing immigrants and to attract value in-
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government action such as the steps that have been taken to reduce or
eliminate Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits for "noncitizens,"
including lawful permanent resident aliens." 9
Despite massive financial, logistic, and - now - legislative obsta-
cles, the United States remains a powerful magnet for all types of immi-
grants, while the undocumented use newer, more aggressive and, some-
times, quite ingenious methods to make an entry into the United States.
Once the undocumented alien has made an entry - and if he or she has
neither a criminal past nor engages in criminal activity - the entrant is
accorded some protective due process.
A. Making an Entrance
[The] most extreme [American] fears are epitomized by a highway sign
in Southern California. Caution, the sign warns: in black silhouette
against a yellow background it shows a family running. It is the West
Coast equivalent of a New England deer-crossing sign, but posted, as it
is, along a highway where illegals enter the country from Mexico, the
sign carries a very different message. Here, it says, are people so intent
on flight that they are vulnerable to traffic. Here is a problem so
beyond control that all the government can do is issue warnings."'
creasing ones. One method of doing so is to curtail welfare payouts to recent immi-
grants, as is now proposed by welfare reform legislation.
Buckley, supra note 27, at 99. During 1993, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) accumulated 7,393 cases involving charges of discrimination on
the basis of national origin. See Samuel R. Cacas, The Language of Hate, 22 WTR.
HuM. RTS. 30 (1995).
Most common problems are employers who impose English-only requirements and ac-
cent-based employment practices .... Today, it is more acceptable to focus on
language characteristics as a racial expression rather than race itself. We are going
through bad economic times so language issues are a convenient way to keep a person
who is foreign looking out of the workplace. And as the workplace becomes more
diverse, language restriction is used more often for screening out job applicants.
Id.
189
Fifty-one percent of noncitizens on SSI come from six countries - Mexico, the former
Soviet Union, Cuba, Vietnam, the Philippines, and China .... About two-thirds of
noncitizen SSI recipients live in three states - California, New York, and Florida.
Supplemental Security Income Noncitizen Caseload Continues to Grow: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th
Cong. (1996), available in WEsTLAw, 1996 WL 276554 (prepared statement of Jane L.
Ross, Director Income Security Issues, Health, Education and Human Services Division,
United States General Accounting Office, Fed. News Serv. Cong. Hearing Testimonies).
"i Mills, supra note 111, at 20.
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On May 24, 1993, the Pai Sheng, a Honduran-flagged cargo ship
with about 200 passengers from the People's Republic of China, slipped
beneath the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco and moored at an
abandoned dock in the Golden Gate National Recreational Area.'9' The
passengers disembarked at the dock unwitnessed by INS or any other law
enforcement officers and quickly dispersed throughout the area into
waiting vehicles." Officers from the United States Park Service Police,
the Golden Gate Bridge Police, Military Police from the Presidio military
base, and security officers from a local Veterans Administration Hospital,
acting on information from the Coast Guard, fanned out through the
Golden Gate area, collaring about 182 of the debarkees.' The pas-
sengers from the Pai Sheng were then taken to a building beneath the
Golden Gate Bridge to be detained prior to their exclusion processing.
The Pai Sheng was later apprehended by the U. S. Coast Guard and the
ship's crew admitted that they were involved in an organized smuggling
operation.1
94
One of the Chinese undocumented aliens applied for review of the
exclusion proceedings against him to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The alien "applicant" argued he had made an "entry" into the United
States, since effective entry would require the more elaborate deportation
proceedings rather than expedited exclusion favored by the INS. The
Board stated: "Under our precedent decisions, an "entry" requires: (1) a
crossing into the territorial limits of the United States, i.e., physical
presence; (2) (a) inspection and admission by an immigration officer, or
(b) actual and intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest inspection
point; and (3) freedom from official restraint."'" The Board, rejecting
the INS's argument that the applicant was under "constructive" restraint
found that, because the applicant was free from "anywhere from a half
hour to 9 hours afterward" to leave the area and to mingle with the
population of San Francisco, "the applicant ... made an entry into the
United States when he debarked from his vessel at a place other than a
port of entry and fled into the interior undetected, with every apparent
intention of evading immigration inspection. The mere fact that he entered
an area which was under federal jurisdiction for reasons unrelated to
immigration processing does not render his movement something less than
an entry. '19
" Matter of Z-, 20 IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION 707, 707-09 (B.I.A. 1993).
19 Id. at 709-10.
' Id.
'9 Id. at 710.
'95 Id. at 708.
'96 Id. at 713-14. The INS had argued that the alien's presence in the area of a
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Undocumented aliens have come a long way from the days of the
summary arrest and deportation of Fong Yue Ting and the potentially
eternal imprisonment on Ellis Island of the luckless Mr. Mezei,'" enjoy-
ig a right of due process that was not so certain even thirty-five years
ago. The key factor for aliens, giving rise to the right to due process, is
the ability to make an effective entry:
"Entry" is an important concept in immigration law, because an alien
who has made an entry is a "person" within the jurisdiction of the
United States, whether or not that entry was legal. As a person protected
by the U.S. Constitution, the alien who has made an entry is entitled to
deportation proceedings rather than exclusion proceedings as a forum for
adjudicating his or her right to be or remain in the United States. The
distinction between these two types of proceedings is significant, because
in deportation proceedings the government carries the burden of proof,
the alien has greater procedural rights, and an automatic stay of deporta-
tion is granted pending a direct petition for review in federal court
(except for a narrowly drawn class of "aggravated felons"). 98
Once the alien has entered, the story has just begun, since thereafter
follows a period where the alien's status must receive a label and be
accorded rights concomitant with the label so conferred - legal immi-
grant, asylee, refugee, nonimmigrant, undocumented alien or, maybe,
deportee or detainee. Even under circumstances where it may appear that
aliens should receive special review, the INS and the federal government,
under very considerable powers of discretion, are virtually free to revoke
or adversely alter alien status.
In a case marked by a tortuous procedural history, Legal Assistance
for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. U.S. Dept. of State,199 the Supreme
Court ordered that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reconsider its appellate decision favoring Vietnamese asylee appellees, in
federal park was analogous to hiding in an airport lavatory, which was determined
under precedential case law as not tantamount to an entry and this would have allowed
the INS to use the exclusion procedure to remove the alien. Id.
"9 The point is all the more compelling when one considers that undocumented
aliens have no legal basis for entry, while Fong Yue Ting and his brethren and Mezei
had legal status that was revoked by governmental action lacking due process. The
government has the power to do almost the same thing to a Mezei today, but not to
Fong Yue Ting.
' See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 8, at 1-23.
9 See Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. U.S. Dept. of State, 45
F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 2521 (U.S. June 17, 1997) (No.
95-1521).
1998]
110 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. [Vol. 30:57
light of Section 633 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (ILRIRA). ° The case involved the petitions
of Vietnamese immigrants claiming discrimination since they were being
forced by the United States consulate to return from Hong Kong to
Vietnam to apply for asylum. The Court of Appeals had found that the
Department of State's action was reviewable on the basis of 8 U.S.C.
Section 1152(a),"' which states in part: "[N]o person shall ... be dis-
criminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the
person's ... nationality ... or place of residence." However, the Su-
preme Court, in a per curiam opinion, required the Court of Appeals to
reconsider its decision under the language of Section 633, which states
that nothing in Section 1152(a)(1) "shall be construed to limit the authori-
ty of the Secretary of State to determine the procedures for the processing
of immigrant visa applications or the locations where such applications
will be processed."
' Enacted as Division C of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
1 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1988 & 1997 Supp.) The asylees had appealed the INS's
decision under the Administrative Procedure Act as "aggrieved parties." 45 F.3d 469,
471 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988)). The Court of Appeals held that
the INS's interpretation of where the asylees should be processed for their visas could
not be upheld under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988), since "[t]he interpretation and
application of the regulation so as to discriminate against the Vietnamese on the basis
of their nationality is in violation of the Act, and therefore not in accordance with
law." 45 F.3d at 473-74.
2 MlIRA, supra note 6, § 633, amending Sec. 202(a)(1) of the INA. Under the
facts in the first Court of Appeals decision, the State Department in 1993 had instruct-
ed an unwilling consulate in Hong Kong to require Vietnamese applicants to return to
Vietnam for visa processing. See 45 F.3d at 471. This position was consistent with the
INS's claim at the time that there was an ongoing abuse of the asylee status by visa
petitioners.
[The asylum] process has on occasion been misinterpreted by ineligible aliens as a due
process for obtaining work authorization or for avoiding deportation. As you know, the
criteria for granting asylum are the same as for granting refugee status. But many illegal
aliens in the United States file frivolous asylum claims as a way to gain work authori-
zation or to delay deportation. Often, they use standardized documentation packages
which satisfy the basic application requirements but fail to make a legitimate case for
a well-founded fear of persecution. They simply want to take advantage of the lengthy
process of administrative and judicial review which allows them to remain here until
their cases are decided.
The INS must respond to this abuse of asylum regulations as it responds to all efforts
to circumvent U.S. immigration laws - with tougher enforcement and better application
of those laws ....
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In another case, INS v. Elramly,' the Supreme Court - although
first granting certiorari - refused to return to the days of Marcello v.
Bonds to review a resident alien's request to waive deportation on the
basis of a 1982 conviction for the sale of $100 of hashish. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had identified the question in the
case as being whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had
properly considered "unusual or outstanding" countervailing equities in
order for it to exercise its statutory discretion to waive deportation.'
"However, before its official term even started, the Court vacated and
remanded the case back to the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to re-
consider the case in light of the newly enacted Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996," which provides for deportation without
an immigration court hearing for certain aliens convicted of aggravated
felonies.
In United States v. Ogbomon,' the Supreme Court was presented
the question of whether or not sentencing judges can directly order
defendants to be deported. The Court, however, dismissed the case's writ
of certiorari as improvidently granted, thereby passing up the opportunity
to resolved a conflict among the circuits over whether or not judges
should be strictly limited to referring defendants to the INS for deporta-
tion proceedings.'
The only immigration case that was fully decided by the Supreme
Court during the 1996-97 term was INS v. Yang.' In Yang, the Su-
preme Court held that the U.S. Attorney General is entitled to ignore the
Gene McNary, INS Response to Immigration Reform, xiv IN DEFENSE OF THE ALiEN
6-7 (Lydio F. Tomasi ed., 1992).
73 F.3d 220 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (Mar. 18, 1996),
vacated and rem'd, INS v. Elramly, 117 S. Ct. 31 (Sept. 16, 1996).
204 73 F.3d at 223-24.
205 See Stephanie Hinz, Court Acts Upon Last Immigration Case on Its Schedule by
Removing It from the Calendar, WasT's LEGAL NEws, Jan. 14, 1997, available in 1997
WL 9349 (referring to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996, Pub. L. No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)). Courts of Appeal have likewise
held that the AEDPA, as amended by the URIRA of 1996, divests the courts of
jurisdiction "if an alien was found deportable for two or more crimes of moral
turpitude not arising from a single scheme of criminal conduct and has served or been
sentenced to a prison or correctional institution for one year or more." Arevalo-Lopez
v. INS, 104 F.3d 100, 101 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Section 306(d) of the IIRIRA,
amending Section 440(a) of the AEDPA).
55 F.3d 638 (11th cir. 1995), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (Oct. 1, 1996), dis-
missed, 117 S.Ct. 725, 1997 WL 8529 (Jan. 10, 1997).
' See Hinz, supra note 205.
117 S. Ct. 350 (1996).
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"entry fraud" exception (INS may disregard fraud, no matter how egre-
gious, when considering a waiver of deportation) and may consider acts
of fraud committed by an alien at the time of his/her U.S. entry when
deciding whether to grant a discretionary waiver of deportation.' The
fact that this "generous disposition" exists neither compels nor requires
the INS to exercise it; because as long as the agency does not engage in
an "irrational departure,"' ° it is entitled to nearly unfettered discre-
tion.211 The Court noted in this Fall 1996 decision that jurisdiction to
review the Attorney General's discretion was not confined by Section
306(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996,212 since that provision would not become effective until
April 1, 1997. Section 306(a) provides in part: "[N]otwithstanding any
other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review ... any
... decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is
specified under [Title 8 U.S.C.] to be in the discretion of the Attorney
General .... 23
Among numerous lower court decisions involving alien immigration
issues during 1995-97, limitations on alien due process stand starkly
illustrated. In one case from the Southern District of New York, an
alien's denial of adjustment of status by the INS was upheld on a sum-
mary judgment motion, although questions of fact were raised by (1) the
INS's assertion that the alien's documents were forgeries and (2) the INS,
while refusing to inform the alien of the basis for its conclusion, preclud-
ed him from rebutting the allegations.214 In separate cases from the
Ninth Circuit, two Filipino appellants were denied asylum since they were
lacking in "well-founded fear[s] of persecution" upon their potential return
to their country.2 I5 In one case, the Court of Appeals, though noting that
the appellant had met most of the prima facie test required to qualify for
suspension of deportation,21' held the BIA was within its discretion
2 117 S. Ct. at 352-54.
2,0 Behavior that is "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion" within the
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988 & Supp.
1994).
211 117 S.Ct. at 353-54.
212 IIRIRA, supra note 6, § 306(a).
213 117 S. Ct. at 352 n.1.
2"4 Kodza v. McElroy, 1996 WL 737201 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
215 Astrero v. INS, 104 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1996); Chanco v. INS, 82 F.3d 298,
300 (9th Cir. 1996).
216 An alien must establish:
(1) he has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of at
least 7 years; (2) he is a person of good moral character, [and] (3) his deportation
would result in "extreme hardship" to himself or his immediate family member who is
[Vol1. 30:57
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when it found that there would be no "extreme hardship" to the alien if
he were deported2 7 In a case with similar themes, the Ninth Circuit
denied asylum to a Filipino army officer who was wanted for prosecution
by the Philippines government for complicity in the 1987 coup attempt
against President Corazon Aquino.215 Distinguishing a coup from a com-
mon crime, the court crafted a rule:
These cases recognize that the fear of prosecution must be evaluated in
the context of the legitimacy of the law being enforced. When a govern-
ment does not respect the internationally recognized human right to
peacefully protest, punishment by such a government for a politically
motivated act may arguably not constitute a legitimate exercise of sover-
eign authority and may amount to persecution.
Here, the record shows that diverse political views are tolerated in the
Philippines, and [the alien] could have expressed his political opinion
without resort to a violent attempt to overthrow the democratically
elected government. Because lawful means, as an alternative to coup
d'etat, were available, the BIA reasoned that the prosecution he faces is
not on account of his political opinion but on account of his illegal
action. We agree 2 9
Another decision of interest affecting alien due process was an
Eleventh Circuit case where the INS was not bound to waive deportation
for an alien who, as part of a plea bargain, was told by U.S. attorneys
who entered into the written plea agreement that the government would
not institute deportation proceedings.' The court, responding to the ap-
a United States citizen or legal alien.
104 F.3d at 266-67 (citing Immigration & Naturalization Act § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(a)(1)). Effective April 1, 1997, the physical presence requirement was increased
by § 304 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Div. C, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997, which amends the
INA to create § 240A, providing a new "cancellation of removal" procedure which is
only available if an alien can prove continuous physical presence in the United States
for 10 years.
217
In determining whether to suspend deportation on grounds of extreme hardship, the
Board construes extreme hardship narrowly, and this Court may not substitute its sense
of what constitutes hardship in a given case unless the Board abused its discretion, by
failing to consider all relevant facts bearing upon extreme hardship or to articulate rea-
sons supported by the record for denying suspension of deportation.
Astrero, 104 F.3d at 267 (citations omitted). '"
238 82 F.3d at 300.
219 Id. at 302.
22 San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1996).
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parent reliance of the U.S. attorneys on the United States Attorney's
Manual as the source of their authority, stated that the manual was for
guidance only and did "not have the force of law."' The court upheld
the district court which had affirmed the INS's deportation proceedings,
reasoning under agency analysis that, since the Attorney General had not
delegated her power, a U.S. Attorney or could not even negotiate regard-
ing deportation without obtaining specific approval from the Assistant
Attorney General of the Criminal Division. m
In a Seventh Circuit decision, the court considered the community
service of a Filipino family who had come to the United States in 1982
on student and student dependent visas and who, when they had attempt-
ed to renew the visas after one year, had deportation proceedings initiated
against them.m In an opinion by Chief Judge Posner, on reviewing the
BIA denial of the application for suspension of deportation, the court
evaluated the "extreme hardship" of the family's being returned to the
Philippines, noting the great deal of community service the husband and
wife had rendered since being in the United States, but especially took
note of the plight of their child, Lancelot, who "ha[d] no competence in
any language other than English," ' and who would have a hard time
adjusting to Filipino society. The court found that the BIA had failed to
properly weigh the family's "community service," which was a "factor to
be considered in deciding whether the statutory criterion of extreme
hardship ha[d] been satisfied, so the Board [could not] disregard it" when
deciding if extreme hardship were shown to exercise discretion to suspend
deportation.'
' Id. at 1070.
I d. at 1070 n.4 (emphasis added). However, consider the following:
I respectfully dissent. The principal issue in this case is not the authority of the United
States Attorney's Office with respect to deportation. Rather, the critical issue is whether
there has been a violation of San Pedro's fundamental right to due process if, in fact,
the government reneged on a prosecutorial promise made as part of San Pedro's plea
agreement.
Id. at 1072 (Goettel, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
m Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447, 448 (7th Cir. 1995).
224 Id. at 451.
' Id. at 452. But consider:
No administrative opinion has held that an end of service to the community can
produce extreme hardship to the alien. The BIA did not have to explain a change of
position, for it has not changed positions. I therefore do not understand what the
majority can mean in saying that "it is the law of this case that community assistance
must be considered."
70 F.3d at 456 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Judge Easterbrook argued that, since the
INA commits definition of "extreme hardship" to "the Attorney General and his
delegates" and that "reasonable men could easily differ" as to the construction of these
(Vol. 30:57
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In another case involving a Filipino petitioner, an illegitimate child
born in the Philippines in 1946 to a U.S. citizen and Filipino mother was
unable to prove paternity until 1990 and was denied citizenship on the
basis of the lapse of time.' The appellee was unsuccessful in asserting
that the 1940 Nationality Act, which required proof of paternity as a
prerequisite to naturalization, created unequal treatment since the Act
required an illegitimate child born out of the country to an alien mother
and U.S. citizen father be legitimated or prove his/her paternity before
reaching majority, but which did not impose a similar requirement on an
illegitimate child born abroad to an alien father and U.S. citizen mother
nor on legitimate children born out of the country to a parent who was
a U.S. citizen.' Although noting a blood test which had proven
Ablang's father to be a U.S. citizen with 95.77% probability,' the
Ninth Circuit applied the "facially legitimate and bona fide reason test"
enunciated in Fiallo v. Belltm and held that the statute involved was
not lacking in a rational basis and was, therefore, not unconstitutional z0
The Supreme Court denied certiorari of this case.
In a decision from the District Court in New Jersey, a deportation
statute was held unconstitutional, which rendered an alien deportable
whenever the Secretary of State finds the alien's presence "would have
potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences."' The Secre-
tary of State had sent a letter to the Attorney General requesting that the
alien, who was a member of one of Mexico's most influential and politi-
cally active families and whose brother was murdered during an election
campaign, be deported to avoid a chilling effect on mutual law enforce-
ment issues between the United States and Mexico. The court held that
the statute, Section 242(a)(4)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
violated Fifth Amendment due process, since it did not provide the alien
sufficient notice of its consequences and was void for vagueness.z2
However, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case with di-
rections to dismiss since the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
words, the court should have deferred to the BIA's "narrow interpretation" of the
Salameda's circumstances. Id. at 453, 457-58 (citing Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981)).
' Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701
(1996).
2 Id. at 803-04.
Id. at 802, 805-06.
430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977).
2' 52 F.3d at 805-06.
" Massieu v. Reno, 915 F.Supp. 681, (D. NJ. 1996), reh'g denied, 91 F.3d 416,
(3d Cir. 1996).
212 915 F.Supp. at 681.
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plaintiff's claim under Section 106 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. Section 1105(a),
where, if a petitioner wishes to challenge deportation, he/she must first
"exhaust available administrative remedies and then petition for review"
in the courts."3
B. Aliens and Public Benefits: Proposition 187 and Progeny
Without a constant and sincere pursuit of the shining but never com-
pletely attainable ideal of the rule of law above men, of "reason" above
"personal preference," we would not have a civilized government. If that
ideal be an illusion, to dispel it would cause men to lose themselves in
an even greater illusion, the illusion that personal power can be benev-
olently exercised. Unattainable ideals have far more influence in molding
human institutions toward what we want them to be than any practical
plan for the distribution of goods and services by executive [or judicial]
fiat.Y4
On November 16, 1994, District Judge Mariana Pfaelzer for the
Central District of California entered a temporary restraining order en-
joining sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 of Proposition 187, a California voter
initiative, eight days after it was voted into law. 5 On December 14,
1994, the court granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining "implementa-
tion and enforcement of those sections.""ns In response to a motion for
summary judgment by the plaintiffs, the court granted the motion in part
and denied it in part, stating that the preliminary injunction would remain
in place until the case was resolved in its entirety.n?
"Proposition 187 consists of ten sections: a preamble (section 1), a
section pertaining to the amendment and severability of the initiative
(section 10) and eight substantive sections (sections 2-9)." ' The eight
substantive sections consist of five types of provisions. The first type
consist of "provisions which require state officials to verify or determine
the immigration status of arrestees, applicants for social services and
health care, and public school students and their parents, by either
233 91 F.3d at 417, 426.
2 Thurman Arnold, Professor Harts' Theology, 73 HARV. L. RE-V. 1298, 1311
(1960).
23 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F.Supp. 755, 763-64 (C.D.
Cal. 1995). The measure was passed by a vote of 59% to 41% on November 8, 1994
and was effective the next day. Id. at 763.
Id. at 764. The injunction was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on July 14, 1995.
Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 59 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1995).
17 Id. at 764, 787.
218 Id. at 764.
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classifying persons based on state-created categories of immigration
status ... or verifying immigration status by reference to federal immi-
gration laws." ' The second group of provisions "require state officials
to notify individuals that they are apparently present in the United States
unlawfully and that they must 'either obtain legal status or leave the
United States."'"' The third group of provisions "require state agencies
to report immigration status information to state and federal authorities,
and to cooperate with the INS regarding persons whose immigration
status is suspect. '"24 Next, the fourth group, are provisions "which re-
quire facilities to deny social services, health care services and public
education to individuals based on immigration status."'42 The fifth and
last group contain criminal penalties for falsifying immigration docu-
ments 43
The initiative has a dual purpose and effect. The classification, notifica-
tion and cooperation/reporting provisions taken together constitute a
regulatory scheme designed to deter illegal aliens from entering or
remaining in the United States by (1) detecting those persons present in
the United States in violation of either state-created criteria for lawful
immigration status or federal immigration laws; (2) notifying those
persons of their purported unlawful status and ordering them to obtain
legal status or leave the country; and (3) maintaining a system of
reporting and cooperation between state and federal agencies to effect
the removal of those persons. These provisions cannot be read as except
a regulatory scheme; and indeed, defendants have not seriously urged
any other reading. While the benefits denial provisions also have the
purpose of deterring illegal aliens from entering or remaining in the
United States, and arguably may be viewed as part of the same regula-
tory scheme, they have the additional purpose of forbidding the use of
public funds to provide social services, health care and education to
persons deemed to be present in the United States illegally.2"
Judge Pfaelzer noted California law holds that "all presumptions
favor the validity of initiative measures and mere doubts as to validity are
insufficient," and that provisions which may be federally preempted, if
they can stand alone, may be severed from the rest of an initiative "so
2" Id. at 764-65.
24 Id. at 765.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
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that the remainder may take effect."' 45 In California, for a provision to
be severable, it must be "grammatically, functionally, and volitionally
separable" and can be removed without "affecting the wording of any
other provision."2  Judge Pfaelzer found that the sections and subsec-
tions of Proposition 187 were each "a distinct grammatical unit and
thus... capable of being severed from the other sections and subsections
without affecting the wording of any other section or rendering what
remains unintelligible." 47 Based on that observation and the principle
that "if the voters had known that some of the initiative's provisions
would be held invalid, they would have preferred the implementation of
the remaining portions, rather than the invalidation of the entire initia-
tive,"' Judge Pfaelzer held that the invalid or preempted portions could
be severed from the sections that could be preserved.
Judge Pfaelzer used the three tests in De Canas v. Bica249 to deter-
mine if the initiative were preempted: (1) whether the state statute is a
regulation of immigration, an exclusive federal power, (2) whether the
statute is in conflict with federal law in an area where Congress intended
to "occupy the field"; and (3) whether the state statute conflicts with
federal law making compliance with state and federal law impossible.'
Stating that Proposition 187 had a "direct and substantial impact on
immigration" ' and that state agents are "unqualified - and also unau-
thorized - to make determinations of immigration status," since their
function in administering state-federal cooperative programs is "ministerial
rather than ... discretionary," 2 Judge Pfaelzer held:
[Ihe classification, notification and cooperation/reporting provisions of
the initiative, contained in sections 4 through 9 and in the preamble,
which are aimed solely at regulating immigration, are preempted. The
provisions which have the permissible purpose and effect of denying
state-funded benefits to persons who are unlawfully present in the
United States are not a regulation of immigration and therefore survive
the first De Canas test. 3
24 Id. at 765-66 (quoting Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Cal. 1991)).
246 Id. at 766.
24 Id. at 767.
24S Id.
24 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (holding a California statute prohibiting an employer from
knowingly employing an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United
States is not preempted by federal law).
'" League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F.Supp. at 768.
25' Id. at 769.
252 Id. at 770.
25' Id. at 771.
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Next, under the second De Canas test, the Judge found that, while
Section 1 and Sections 4-9 dealing with classification, notification, and
cooperation/reporting requirements were preempted, the benefits denial
provisions of sections 5-8 were not, nor were sections 2 and 3
criminalizing the production and use of false documentation." 4
Finally, under the third test, Judge Pfaelzer considered whether
Proposition 187's classification, notification, and reporting; benefits denial;
and criminalization provisions were preempted on the basis of direct
conflict with federal law. First Judge Pfalezer found that, as under the
first and second De Canas tests,
The classification, notification and cooperation/reporting provisions
directly contradict the INA's mandate that the procedure outlined in the
INA 'shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the
deportability of an alien.' These provisions create a new, wholly inde-
pendent procedure, pursuant to which state law enforcement, welfare,
health care, and [state] education officials - rather than federal officials
and immigration judges - are required to determine the deportability of
aliens and effect their deportation.. .
As a result, these provisions, therefore, were preempted.
The benefits denial provisions were given an in-depth, complex
analysis by Judge Pfaelzer under the third test. First, the classification of
eligible beneficiaries for public benefits was found by Judge Pfaelzer as
being underinclusive, missing such categories as asylees and parolees, and
in conflict with federal systems such as the SAVE system. 6 However,
Judge Pfalezer found these provisions to be severable from the remainder
of the initiative and, while certain other language was in conflict with
federal law and required severance, the balance of the benefits verification
provisions were upheld." Next, under the benefits denial provisions, the
Judge noted conflicts in sections 5 and 6 with provisions for federal
programs, such as the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program and
federally funded health care facilities, but reserved future judgment on
certain aspects of these sections. 8 Judge Pfaelzer found section 7 of the
initiative, denying education to undocumented children and to child
citizens of undocumented alien parents, to be entirely preempted by Plyler
Id. at 775-76.
2,5 Id. at 777.
' Id. at 777-78; for a discussion of the application of the SAVE database system,
see also supra note 38.
2 Id. at 779-80.
2a Id. at 780-85.
119
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
v. Doe and federal law in general. 9 However, Judge Pfaelzer did not
find section 8 of the initiative, prohibiting public postsecondary schools
from admitting, enrolling, or permitting the attendance of persons who are
not "authorized under federal law to be present in the United States," to
be preempted by the third De Canas test, nor did she find preempted
sections 2 and 3 of the initiative punishing document fraud by fines and
imprisonment. °
In summary, in her opinion decided November 20, 1995, Judge
Pfaelzer left in place the preliminary injunction issued nearly a year
before, holding that the state scheme aping INS enforcement was pre-
empted; that certain aspects of the state benefits denial provisions where
these did not conflict with federal law were not preempted; that the
denial of primary and secondary education was preempted by Plyler, but
that the denial of postsecondary enrollment was not preempted; and that
the initiative's criminalization of document forgery did not conflict with
federal law."'
The debate over Proposition 187 and the Pfaelzer decision heralded
Congressional action which resulted in the passage of Chapter 14 of Title
8 of the United States Code - "Restricting Welfare and Public Benefits
for Aliens."' 2 Section 1601(5) sums up the general purpose of the act:
"[ilt is a compelling government interest to remove the incentive for
illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits."' 3
Additionally, the act includes this provision:
With respect to the State authority to make determinations concerning
the eligibility of qualified aliens for public benefits in this chapter, a
State that chooses to follow the Federal classifications in determining the
eligibility of such aliens for public assistance shall be considered to
have chosen the least restrictive means available for achieving the
compelling governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in
accordance with national immigration policy.M
29 Id. at 785-86.
2w Id. at 786.
2' Id. at 786-87.
262 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1645 (1997 Supp.), Title IV, Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2260 (Aug. 22, 1996).
8 U.S.C. § 1601(5) (1997 Supp.), Title IV, § 400, Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2260 (Aug. 22, 1996). The title of Section 1601 is "Statements of National Policy
Concerning Welfare and Immigration."
8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (1997 Supp.), Title IV, § 400, Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2260 (Aug. 22, 1996).
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In addition to such major provisions under Chapter 14, such as Subchap-
ter I, "Eligibility for Federal Benefits"' and Subchapter I, "Attribu-
tion of Income and Affidavits of Support," Subchapter II is titled
"Eligibility for State and Local Public Benefits Programs." Section
1621, subsection a, states:
§ 1621. Aliens who are not qualified aliens or nonimmigrants ineligible
for State and local public benefits.
(a) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as
provided in subsections (b) and (d) of this section, an alien who is
not -
(1) a qualified alien (as defined in section 1641 of this title),
(2) a nonimmigrant under the Immigration and Nationality Act
[8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq.], or
(3) an alien who is paroled into the United States under section
212(d)(5) of such Act [8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(5)] for less than
one year,
is not eligible for any State or local public benefit (as defined in
subsection (c) of this section).'
The Subchapter limits federal benefits to "qualified alien[s]" as defined in 8
U.S.C. § 1641, with certain eligibility exceptions allowed for specific federal benefits
under 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611(b), 1641 (1997 Supp.).
I This Subchapter imposes a continuing requirement of fiscal responsibility for
sponsors of aliens, particularly those who might avail themselves of public benefits; the
states are also given the right to attribute "sponsors income and resources to the alien
with respect to State programs." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1631-1632 (1997 Supp.).
8 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1622 (1997 Supp.), Title IV, §§ 411-412, Pub.L. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2268-2269 (Aug. 22, 1996). This passage appears to find philosophical support in
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
2- 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (1997 Supp.). Subsection (b) lists exceptions to this preclu-
sion from benefits such as emergency medical treatment, short-term disaster relief,
public health immunizations and:
(4) Programs, services or assistance (such as soup kitchens, crisis counseling and in-
tervention, and short-term shelter) specified by the Attorney General, in the Attorney
General's sole and unreviewable discretion after consultation with appropriate Federal
agencies and departments, which (A) deliver in-kind services at the community level,
including through public or private nonprofit agencies; (B) do not condition the
provision of assistance, the amount of assistance provided, or the cost of assistance
provided on the individual recipient's income or resources; and (C) are necessary for the
protection of life or safety.
8 U.S.C § 1621(b)(1)-(4) (1997 Supp.). Subsection (d) allows states to make otherwise
ineligible aliens under Section 1621(a) eligible through provisions in state laws. 8
U.S.C. § 1621(d) (1997 Supp.).
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Section 1622 authorizes states to determine eligibility for, any state public
benefits for "qualified alien[s]," nonimmigrant aliens and aliens paroled
for less than one year. 9 The Section also provides exceptions for refu-
gees and asylees based on time limitations, certain permanent resident
aliens, veterans and aliens and dependents based on active U.S. military
service and a grandfathering for aliens "lawfully residing in any State"
until January 1, 1997Y0
Although Proposition 187's attack on undocumented aliens was
blunted by Judge Pfaelzer's analysis and the severing of provisions di-
rectly assaulting constitutionally accorded alien protections, the essence of
the initiative lingered because the court permitted benefits denial provi-
sions that did not conflict with federal law to remain. The recently en-
acted Chapter 14, Title 8, United States Code in effect sanctions Califor-
nia, New York, Texas and more hesitant states to move forward in their
goals to restrict or reduce alleged costs resulting from the infusion of
undocumented aliens into American society. The new amendments to the
INA will require re-examination of holdings such as Lewis v. Grinker,"I
where the Second Circuit affirmed the district court in enjoining the
Secretary of Health and Human Services from denying Medicaid coverage
for prenatal care to otherwise eligible women who were not permanently
residing under color of law (PRUCOL).tm
Denial of public benefits for "citizen children" of undocumented
aliens has been central to the debate over the legal and ethical permissi-
bility of foreclosing benefits to undocumented aliens.' Although citizen
8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (1997 Supp.).
8 U.S.C. § 1622 (b)(1)-(4) (1997 Supp.).
965 F.2d 1206, 1221 (2d Cir. 1992).
ze The court's reasoning was posited primarily on the U.S. citizen status of the
children:
Newborn children are automatically eligible for Medicaid in their own name if their
mothers were eligible for Medicaid-sponsored prenatal care. If non-PRUCOL pregnant
women are ineligible for Medicaid, then the child of an alien would not automatically
be eligible for Medicaid while the child of a citizen would. Yet both children are
United States citizens. Such discrimination against the citizen child on the basis of the
alien status of the parent would raise serious equal protection questions.
Id. at 1217 (citations omitted).
27 See Larry M. Leaman, The Citizen Child and Undocumented Parents, 52 PUB.
WELFARE, Spring 1994, at 21.
We must realize that while we have a good count on the IRCA amnesty population in
this country, we can only guess at the number of undocumented parents of citizen
children, much less the total undocumented population. I will venture that most public
agency officials with AFDC, food stamp, child welfare, Medicaid, and housing assistance
caseloads under their jurisdictions do not know how many such citizen-child cases they
actually have in these programs. We do not know because we do not ask, and we do
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children have a clear claim to public benefits inherent in their native-born
citizenship status, their parents or foreign-born siblings may not. The state
of affairs may not only cause a schism in the health of immigrant family
members, but the bar to benefits may also cause deleterious effects to the
general public health. 4 The controversy has also brought into focus
race, class, and gender issues inherent in denial of public benefits to
discrete groups of potential beneficiariesfma
Equal protection analysis does not go far in assessing the position of
the undocumented alien in regard to public benefits, since undocumented
alien rights have largely been viewed through the ad hoc prism of scat-
tered lower court decisions, and Plyler did not reach equal protection as
a broad-focus issue. Perhaps the most telling component of the public
benefits debate is the aura or implication of exploitation inherent in the
fact that industries, such as agriculture in California, benefitted incalcula-
bly from the cheap, unorganized labor that the undocumented provided.
not ask because federal law and regulations preclude us from asking. In other programs,
we may ask in order to determine family composition and eligibility, but such data are
not tracked in the aggregate, as they are not statistics we are mandated to generate.
All states with large immigrant and alien populations are wrestling with this issue. See,
e.g., Carolyn S. Salisbury, Comment, The Legality of Denying State Foster Care to
Illegal Alien Children: Are Abused and Abandoned Children the First Casualties in
America's War on Immigration?, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 633, 634 (1996) (presenting one
Floridian's view of Plyler means to its minor population of the undocumented).
24 Schuler, supra note 7, at 280.
Negative repercussions of Proposition 187 are already being felt. The portion of the act
purporting to deny medical care to undocumented persons has been particularly harmful.
Even before the election, while proponents harangued about the money denial of medical
care would save, opponents were countering that disease could spread more easily with-
out medical care, even to the documented and citizen population. Within the two weeks
after the measure passed, hospital outpatient clinics and community facilities reported a
ten to twenty percent decline in patient visits, since undocumented patients feared
deportation if they kept their appointments. One death has already been blamed on the
measure; a 12-year-old boy died of leukemia complications when his parents, hearing of
the passage of the proposition, were afraid to take him to his clinic appointments ....
Id. (citations omitted).
Undocumented immigrants fare much worse [in not seeking preventive care]. Practically
two-thirds (65.2%) of the immigrants [in a particular sample] never had a general check-
up when not ill. Preventive care is least common among recent undocumented migrants,
and most common among long-term legal immigrants. However, recent legal migrants
are more likely to have had a check-up when not ill than undocumented immigrants
who have been in the U.S. more than 3 years, indicating the importance of immigration
status, and its socioeconomic characteristics, for understanding patterns of preventive care
usage.
Chavez et al., supra note 49, at 99 (citations omitted).
"5 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection
of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509 (1995).
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Once the workers had finished their tasks, leaders, such as Governor
Wilson, swiftly switched positions and advocated their removal:
California's Proposition 187, adopted in conscious violation of the
holding in Plyler, may offer a broader context in which to understand
the inadequacy of hornbook equal protection doctrine to address the
problem of state discrimination against "illegal" aliens. Plyler's analysis
was predicated on the likely permanence of the children's presence in
Texas and the life-long infliction of harm and exploitation that keeping
them illiterate would entail. The Court decided Plyler during the period
when the so-called "Texas proviso" left most employers immune from
sanctions for availing themselves of "illegal" aliens' labor .... Thus,
the aspect of illegal migration addressed in Plyler involves collective
hypocrisy, permitting the "illegal" label to reinforce the vulnerability of
migrants to exploitation.
But Proposition 187 adds a further dimension not present in Plyler that
should also be addressed. Unlike the Texas law in Plyler, Proposition
187 imposes a systematic program for driving "illegal" aliens out of
California. In Governor Pete Wilson's vivid terminology, it aims to
induce aliens to "self-deport". . . . It therefore provokes us to inquire
whether any limits exist on a state's creation of disincentives for unlaw-
ful residents to enter or remain in the state. The problem is framed by
the peculiar circumstance that the state has legitimate interest in deter-
ring "illegal" aliens from residence but no power to remove them
directly .... 276
The trend to curtail the benefits of aliens is a direct result of the
backlash against the undocumented and a response to fiscal crises, which,
as in prior times, have been blamed by the nativist element on immigrant
aliens in general and the undocumented in particular. Congress, for
example, in 1993 and more recently, limited Social Security benefits by
increasing residence requirements so that many aliens became ineligi-
ble.' Other states can be expected to take steps imitative of California,
as Wisconsin and New York did in the 1980s following the enactment of
IRCA, curtailing medical and other benefits used by aliens.'
276 See Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws, supra note 48, at 1444-45 (citations omitted).
n See Schuck, supra note 10, at 91.
Carrasco, supra note 51, at 591, 596 n.23 (1994) (stating that after the enactment
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Wisconsin legislatively banned
medical assistance benefits to certain aliens and New York used an administrative di-
rective to disqualify newly legalized aliens from public assistance).
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Several New York counties and state senators filed suit claiming that,
in carrying out its immigration policy, the federal government violated
various statutory and constitutional provisions, including the Naturalization
Clause, the Guarantee Clause, the Invasion Clause, the Tenth Amendment,
and the Administrative Procedure Act.' The plaintiffs sought monetary
support from the federal government to compensate New York and its
subdivisions for the expenditures it has been constrained to make as a
result of the federal government's immigration policy.' Using such
cases as McCulloch v. Marylando Baker v. Carr,' and Fiallo v.
Bell, ' the court held that the claims brought under the Naturalization
and Guarantee Clauses were nonjusticiable political questions, and that to
be afforded the protection of the Invasion Clause the state must be
exposed to armed hostility from another political entity, such as another
state or foreign country that is intending to overthrow the state's govern-
ment.' In regard to the Tenth Amendment claim that New York was
"coerced" into providing health and other services, the court rejected the
argument that the state's legislative processes had been "commandeered"
by the federal government, stating: "[The state] must provide emergency
medical services to illegal immigrants, this is only true because New
York State participates in the federal Medicaid program, . . a voluntary
program in which states are free to choose whether to participate. If New
York chose not to participate, there would be no federal regulation
requiring the state to provide medical services to illegal aliens." ' The
court pointed out that aliens had been incarcerated under the state's laws,
not in response to a federal obligation, and rebuffed the claim that the
court should review the manner in which the INS used its resources, as
an interference with an internal discretionary matter of a government
agency 5 6
Other states using similar arguments - meeting with similar success
- were California,' New Jersey, 8 and Texas. 9 Following the
z' Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1996).
I d. at 23.
=8 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the federal govern-
ment may exercise its plenary powers even though the effects of such exercises of
power may be onerous to the states. See 82 F.3d at 26.
369 U.S. 186 (1962). There is "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitmene' of naturalization and immigration to Congress. See 82 F.3d at 27.
430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). "Mhe power over aliens is of a political character
and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review." 82 F.3d at 27.
2' 82 F.3d at 28.
' Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
M Id.
California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1997).
's New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1996).
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passage of the plethora of major immigration bills during 1996-97,
litigious states may become energized by what they perceive as a fiscally
restrictionist trend running against undocumented aliens.
C. Culture Clash: The Newly Arrived Encounter Those Who Came
Before
[When immigrants arrive, some kind of magic happens: they do ex-
traordinary things, things they couldn't do at home. In Indochina the
Asians fight, rent by factionalism; here they build and get dressed up
and go to the Westinghouse Awards and Ivy League commencements.
In Greece the young are sunk in a funk, with widespread joblessness;
here they become entrepreneurs. In Jamaica, people find that just living
day to day can be a struggle; here they've raised Colin Powell to
become a hero, general, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[W]e must not permit school texts to imply, as some do, that "America
was founded by white male Euros who broke from Britain over taxes
but retained slaves, and two centuries later the liberation is not complete
because racism is still rampant." Such sour revision is not helpful. And
it omits a salient truth: those seeking justice over the years were lucky
enough to be operating in a country that had not only a Constitution,
but a conscience, to which an appeal could be made. This is a triumph
of idealism that is forever a tribute to the human spirit.'
Evidence abounds in U.S. daily life of both the presence and impact
of immigrants in American society. Immigrants deposit their wealth and
savings in U.S. banks,29' publicly exercise a variety of religions and
folk customs,2" fall prey to victimization and crime often perpetuated
Texas v. United States, No. B-94-228 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
o Peggy Noonan, Why the World Comes Here, in ARGUING IMMIGRATION, supra
note 2, at 178-79.
"' See Lore Croghan, Melting Pot's a Pot of Gold, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Mar. 3-9,
1997, at 3, 44. Greater New York Savings Bank, operating in immigrant neighborhoods
in boroughs such as Brooklyn, has employees who speak 35 languages and ATM
machines offering six language options in a move to serve the surge of 536,000 legal
immigrants who arrived in the New York City area between 1990 and 1994. See ild.
at 44.
1 See Somini Sengupta, Ramadan Enters New York City School Life, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 1997, at Al (commenting that New York City schoolchildren observe "Islam's
holiest period," having an effect on fellow students and school life).
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by other immigrants2' and struggle to bring their families from far-off
homelands to join them in the betterment of their lives.
Although there was some perception of improvement in the 1980s,
analysts have asserted that many recent immigrants are inferior by histor-
ical standards, possessed of few skills and less education, coupled with
the claim that "there are strong links between the shifts in national
origins and declining immigrant skills."29 Claims that recent immigrants
lack skills are puzzling, especially in light of the fact that during the late
1970s and the 1980s, employers were forced to go abroad to recruit
temporary workers for certain professional and semi-professional occupa-
tions, due to a dearth of such persons in the United States. These "so-
journers" were invited under programs which required special immigration
legislation to admit sufficient quantities of skilled workers. The continuing
need for these workers becomes apparent when one stops to note the
difficulty Congress has in abolishing temporary worker legislation that
perpetuates visas for skilled workers such as registered nurses. 2se
Rationalizing more stringent immigration controls posited on a negative
skills assessment seems all the more disingenuous - and downright
9 See Michael Cooper, Evidence in Queens for a Trial in China, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 1997, at 27 (discussing an outbreak of kidnappings and torture against Fujianese
immigrants by other Chinese and how an internationally cooperative police effort by the
NYPD and the PRC police cracked the case).
9 See Celia W. Dugger, Immigrant Study Finds Many Below New Income Limit,
N.Y. TImS, Mar. 16, 1997, at Al. A Federal study found that the new INA amend-
ments would make it very difficult for poor and working-class immigrants to bring
family members to the United States legally, especially for Mexicans and Salvadorans,
since it will require those sponsoring family members to earn at least $19,500 for a
family of four. See id.
2 See Edward Funkhouser & Stephen J. Trejo, The Labor Market Skills of Recent
Male Immigrants: Evidence from the Current Population Survey, 48 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 792 (1995).
2' See Extension of Stay in United States for Nurses, extending the authorized
period of stay for nurses to September 30, 1997, whose "period of authorized stay has
expired or would expire before September 30, 1997 .... " § l(a)(1)-(2), Pub.L. No.
104-302, 110 Stat. 3656 (Oct. 11, 1996).
Again, I will be withdrawing my reservation, but with the understanding that we are not
going to just do this every year, and their employers and the nurses are on notice that
they should use this time to start preparing themselves, No. 1, to go back to their home
country, and, No. 2, to find Americans who can work as nurses in these areas in rural
North Carolina, as well as in Chicago and elsewhere where there are, as I say, spot
shortages of nurses.
EXTENDING PERIOD OF STAY IN UNITED STATES FOR CERTAIN NURSES, PROCEEDINGS
& DEBATES, H.R. DOC. H12293-01, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 4, 1996), available at
1996 WL 56773.
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unfair - when one perceives the volume of immigrant labor - par-
ticularly undocumented - that the United States utilizes to serve its retail
customers, work in its factories, or till its soil and raise its crops. 9
In a similar vein, although there are some tensions over immigrants
in the workforce and the effect of the global economy on jobs,"8 labor
unions and other groups have sought to reach out to immigrant workers
who are often unfamiliar with U.S. laws" - while U.S. law has on
occasion been extended to offer aliens and immigrants some form of
worker protections.' Though laws confuse the immigrant, culture argu-
ably is the issue that causes alarm and conflict for immigrants."° As an
example, consider the situation when Indochinese refugees landed in San
Francisco during the 1970s following the Vietnam War.'
' See Illegal Aliens Make Up 57% of Migrant Farm Work Force, Study Shows,
WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 1, 1996, available at 1996 WL 427620.
The study's results are more than double the estimates made by the U.S. Department
of Labor. The study also found that none of the undocumented workers was denied a
job because of lack of legal identification, two out of 10 illegal alien workers refused
to complain about poor working conditions or wages for fear of deportation, and a
majority of illegal workers favored some kind of unionization. The farmer employers
responded to the study by saying that spotting illegal aliens is an impossible task.
Id.
See Keith Bradsher, Skilled Workers Watch Their Jobs Migrate Overseas, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1995, at Al. While jobs for the skilled migrate, U.S. employers are
also hiring skilled foreigners who will often work more cheaply. See Bob Davis et al.,
Unions Threatened by Global Economy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1996, at All.
' See David Gonzalez, Unions Open Drive to Recruit Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1995, at B4; Pamela G. Rubin, Immigrants as Grievants: Protecting the Rights
of Non-English Speaking Union Members in Labor Arbitration, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ.
557 (1994). On the problem of immigrant comprehension of U.S. law, see James W.
Meeker & John Dombrink, The Undocumented and Their Legal Needs, 15 HUMBOLDT
J. Soc. REL. 105 (1988); Chad Richardson & Joe Feagin, The Dynamics of Legaliza-
tion: Undocumented Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 3 RESEARcH IN POL.
Soc. 179 (1987).
3 See Foo, supra note 41, passim (arguing for such protective legislation); see also
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (extending
protection of the National Labor Relations Act to the undocumented alien). But cf. Cruz
v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that vessels
engaged in foreign operations did not become subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act
when their vessels transitorily reflagged under the U.S. flag, were transferred to an
American corporation, and were leased back to a foreign company).
See Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 92 (1976) ('The complaint
alleged that there are about four million aliens living in the United States; they face
special problems in seeking employment because our culture, language, and system of
government are foreign to them . . ."). Id.
' See The New Arrivals: Indochinese Face Culture Shock, 5 PRACTICE DIGEST 6
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News reports out of San Francisco may have brought home to Ameri-
cans how different these refugees were from others. The reports noted
that animals were being trapped in the city's Golden Gate Park. The
park's ponds were being used -for fishing. The fishermen and trappers,
it turned out, were Hmong refugees from Laos, hill people who were
trying to carry on their rural way of life in the most rustic part of San
Francisco they could find. 3
Sometimes cultural confusion manifests itself in legal issues. Vietnamese
immigrants, for example, have experienced violations of civil rights and
harassment by U.S.-bom citizens and prevailed in resulting civil rights
actions' litigated against the State of California over whether they
could use traditional "gill nets" to fish,' and found that they could not
void a waiver of Miranda and other -rights by asserting that the waiver
was not "knowing and voluntary," since there had been an interpreter
present fluent in Vietnamese and English."
American political and legal analysts have assessed culture as a
necessary factor one must consider. David Ziskind, legal comparativist,
has identified awareness of "cultural bias" as a necessary component of
legal analysis.' Though Ziskind's ideas are targeted toward comparing
laws of different countries and societies, particularly labor laws, the idea
(1983) (published by Nat'l Assn. of Social Workers).
3 Id.
An initial topic was the distinction between mental health and mental illness. Dinh
Nguyen, a social worker with the project, explained] that to the Vietnamese, a mental
illness may have to do with evil spirits, whereas conflicts with a spouse or employer
are usually dealt with by conversation with a friend or a monk. "The idea of being cra-
zy is understood," he sa[id], "but the notion of what craziness entails varies from
culture to culture."
Id. at 8.
' See, e.g., Vietnamese Fishermen's Assn. v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543
F.Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
3 Vietnamese Fishermen's Assn. of America v. California Dept. of Fish & Game,
816 F.Supp. 1468, 1469 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding state law preempted by federal law).
3C United States v. Pham, 815 F.Supp. 1325, 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
7 See David Ziskind, Cultural Bias in Labor Law Comparison, 6 CoMP. LAB. L.
275 (1984).
'Bias is inherent in all thought. Thinking is a process of cumulative experience. It is
embedded in neural patterns that may be modified from time to time but that remain
in the cortex of the brain; and ideas and actions that emerge when those past patterns
are activated .... That body of prior knowledge has a built-in cultural bias. The
conditioning of individual experiences by social interaction tends to form similarities in
bias, or many cultural biases, characteristic of different groups in societies. These take
expression, as patterns, themes, or styles.
Id. at 276.
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of cultural bias, especially emanating from socio-cultural, religious, lin-
guistic, and ideational factors is appropriate when one considers the
immigrant debate. A component of the furor being spouted over legal, as
well as illegal, aliens arises from perception by Americans of various
levels of sophistication who feel the character of U.S. society may be
forever altered by exposure to the multitude of cultures descending on
U.S. shores, resulting in espousal of an old-style nativist sentiment.' A
primary reason for this type of attitude originates in unfamiliarity with the
cultures of other groups and a bias by the perceiving group - whether
biased in favor of U.S. norms or those of another culture - that one's
own preferred norms are superior.
Leading social scientists and legal theorists see some of the these
differences as illusory. Francis Fukuyama, in an essay critiquing Peter
Brimelow's book, Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's Immi-
gration Disaster, explodes the notion that there is a "white" American
cultural group.' Fukuyama believes there was every bit as much dis-
tance among Catholic Irish, Jewish descendants from Russia and the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italians from southern Italy, and other Cauca-
sian groups at the time of their first encounter as there is today when so-
called "white Americans" meet Mexicans and other immigrants: "Though
this is not always apparent today, the degree of cultural and perceived
racial distance between these groups was every bit as great at the time
they arrived here as the distance between the "median" Anglo of today
(named Pezzuli or Steinberg) and a recent Mexican immigrant."'3 °
Fukuyama pointedly assails the inherent "cultural bias" (innate stereo-
typical perceptions) that appear in Brimelow's book:
3W
[P]roposition [187] states that those "suspected" of not being legally documented will
be questioned. That means anyone who looks foreign, speaks with an accent or doesn't
fit into the stereotype of a blond, blue-eyed, red-blooded American. This would create
conflict, paranoia and controversy. Already, United States citizens who appear Hispanic
are asked to show their documentation on a regular basis. These citizens fear Proposi-
tion 187 will legitimize these harassing inquiries.
Schuler, supra note 7, at 280 (citations omitted). Fifty-six percent of African-Americans
voted against the Proposition 187 initiative, possibly under influence of groups such as
the National Urban League, whose spokesperson said "[1]f you're Black and you vote
for 187, you're not just voting against Hispanics, but you're also voting for the kind
of thing that has been used against Blacks since time began." Tamayo, supra note 26,
at 31-32.
' Francis Fukuyama, Culture Vulture, NAT'L REv., May 1, 1995, at 77 (book
review).
310 Id. (emphasis added).
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The fact is that there is a mountain of empirical evidence indicating not
just that Asians may have the right "Puritan, Anglo-Saxon" virtues, but
that they have them to a significantly higher degree than people actually
of Protestant Anglo-Saxon descent (many of whom are today either
ultra-liberals pushing the multiculturalist agenda, or else poorly educated,
low-income workers in the rural South, whose families are fraying and
whose politics are increasingly up for grabs as a result of their down-
ward social mobility).3 "
Culture is perhaps more essential to the immigrant debate than any
other element in the diatribe. William Bennett affirms this assessment:
The immigration issue evokes the strongest passions in the cultural, and
not the economic, arena. Indeed, immigration cannot be fully understood
outside a larger cultural context. There is an alarming reluctance in our
schools and universities to affirm, advance and transmit our common
American culture. And while it has profound implications for immigra-
tion, I believe contemporary American society's most serious problems
are more fundamental than, and different from, immigration. Our prob-
lem does not have to do with legal immigration but with assimilation -
and assimilation not just for people born in foreign lands but for the
people born in this nation.3
Bennett notes that cultural anthropologist David Murray has referred to
new-born children as the "ultimate undocumented aliens," since they are
not born with culture or society and "they must be helped to become
citizens every bit as urgently as, say, refugees from Southeast Asia. If we
fail the American-born children, they will be the aliens who overwhelm
us.1
3 1 3
"Our common American culture" is familiar to most people on earth
through transmission via various forms of media - television, computer
technology, and even books. Perhaps among the other magnets drawing
immigrants - economics, rights under the rule of law, refuge from per-
secution - U.S. culture is one of the most powerful forces drawing in
immigrants legal and undocumented alike.
311 Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
312 Bennett, supra note 43.
313 Id.
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V. NORMATIVE VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS: A WORD ABOUT
PLENARY POWER AND NATURAL LAW
Whatsoever thou wouldst that men should not do to thee, do not do that
to them. This is the whole Law. The rest is explanation.
Ha-Babli (c. 30 B.C.) '4
Deciding 14,000 cases a year, the Board is bound to commit some
howlers.
Circuit Judge Easterbrook (1995)
(referring to Board of Immigration Appeals)"'
Federal immigration power is said to be a "plenary" power of the
federal government: It is a power "[flull, entire, complete, absolute,
perfect, unqualified."316 Insofar as these words affect immigration, what
can they mean? Apparently, as we have seen above, the words connote
a power that springs from itself, spun from the whole cloth of its own
self-creation and self-perpetuation. In a sense the plenary immigration
power is legal fiction - created by necessity via whirring mechanisms of
sovereignty, the necessity for nations to deal transnationally with other
sovereign nations, and the necessary ability of the national power to
regulate the several states when their dealings go beyond their borders or
mere internal affairs. States once held an original sovereign power to
regulate immigration, as Professor Neuman has illustrated," 7 but the
federal government removed the power from the sphere of individual state
governance as a power not only in conflict with federal supremacy but
also a power the states did not wield wisely. There is a question that
flows from this observation: if the states did not, could not wield the
power well, then has the federal government done so?
The federal government essentially created the immigration power
from sparse provisions in the Constitution318 and waited about 100 years
until the post-Civil War Reconstruction to enact equally sparse supple-
mental legislation - primarily based on racial characteristics of the
314 Tim GREAT QUOTATIONs 292 (George Seldes ed., 1960).
311 Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447, 458 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
316 BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY, supra note 80, at 1154.
311 See Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 9, passim.
318 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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subject groups.319 This sparsity was supplemented by judicial decisions,
which were hardly categorizable as the hallmark of jurisprudence:
The applicant has fully met every requirement of the naturalization
statutes except [those provisions] relating to racial limitation. Applicant's
grandfather was a full-blooded Portuguese, and his grandmother was a
native Chinese living on the Island of Macao, a Portuguese possession
near Hong Kong, China. His father married a Chinese native of Macao.
Applicant claims to be a "free white person" through Portuguese strain
on the paternal side.
"Free white persons" includes members of the white or Caucasian race,
as distinct from the black, red, yellow, and brown races ....
Applicant comes within the class of persons of mixed blood. In re
Camille (C.C.) 6 F.256, it was held that a person of half Indian blood,
whose father was a white Canadian and his mother an Indian woman,
is not a "white person," within the meaning of [the statute] ....
It seems clear to this court that applicant Fisher is barred by [the
statute] and his petition is therefore denied?"
The Fisher case above is a good example of the flawed reasoning
that served as the foundation for the evolution of U.S. immigration
policy. In the simple passage above, the judge engages in an analysis of
genetics - or more aptly a crankish form of eugenics - to reach a legal
conclusion based on a federal statute which speaks of "free white per-
son[s]" fifty-two years after the Civil War had ended."1 Is it so certain
that, even today, lawful and unlawful immigrants alike are insulated from
being abused by such bogus, quasi-legal methodology? "
9 A naturalization law was passed in 1870 which declared that "[t]he naturalization
laws are hereby extended to aliens of African nativity, and to persons of African
descent." Act of July 14, 1870, 16 Stat. 256. For a recent evaluation of United States
naturalization policies, categorized as "backward-looking," see Gerald L. Neuman,
Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 237 (1994).
o In re Fisher, 21 F.2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1927).
' Perhaps such considerations are not entirely absent today even at sophisticated
levels of U.S. society. For instance, the cover of the March 24, 1997 issue of the
National Review ('Manchurian Candidate") shows President Clinton, Mrs. Clinton, and
Vice President Gore dressed in Chinese regalia, but also possessing exaggerated and
stereotypical Asian racial characteristics, in regard to a story relating to PRC contribu-
tions to the Clinton campaign war chest. See Rich Lowry, China Syndrome, NAT'L
REv., Mar. 24, 1997, at 38.
" Consider, for example, the process by which an alien obtains a visa in a foreign
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As demonstrated above, aliens who are present within the borders of
the United States do receive some constitutional protections since they are
"persons" within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution. "Thus, they
receive the protection of the Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amend-
ment due process clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment due process and
equal protection clauses."3' The irony and paradox is that, although
aliens are entitled to powerful guarantees of constitutional protection from
action by the individual states, their legal status and the true source of
their alien rights flow from the much more limited, judicially and admin-
istratively driven federal plenary power. In effect, this limitation had, until
recently, made aggressive actions against aliens by individual states
largely irrelevant and legally ineffectual. However, with passage of such
measures as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, states have been given much more leeway to bring alien
rights into the cross-hairs of restrictionism, particularly in their onslaught
on the pale reasoning in the Plyler holding and its thin patina of protec-
tion for the constitutionally vulnerable undocumented alien.
Core to the exchange over the rights of lawful resident and nonresi-
dent aliens, and the rights of undocumented aliens are economic is-
sues,324 since categorizing the rights of aliens as economic in character
accords them far less protection under equal protection doctrine than
rights that are fundamental or which involve suspect classifications.3" In
country from the United States consulate:
The negative decisions of consular officers are theoretically subject to review by a su-
pervisory consul. These supervisors, however, frequently serve more than one consulate,
or are themselves overburdened with casework. In either case, they lack the time
necessary to subject these decisions to more than perfunctory review ....
The State Department may also review consular decisions, but only with regard to ques-
tions of law. Factual determinations remain within the absolute discretion of the consular
officer ... .Moreover, parties adversely affected by a consul's action cannot seek re-
dress in federal courts, since the judiciary has repeatedly held that administrative deter-
minations in this area are final unless judicial review is authorized by explicit statutory
language ....
HULL, supra note 8, at 168 n.12. Of course, foreign aliens have little or no claim
under our federal laws to typical U.S. "due process" or "equal protection," since both
of these protections ordinarily flow from an alien's status as a U.S. "entrant." See
supra note 198 and accompanying text.
m See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 62, § 14.11 at 698.
4 See, e.g., Elizabeth Kay Harris, Economic Refugees: Unprotected in the United
States by Virtue of an Inaccurate Label, 9 AM. UJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y 269 (1993);
Robert W. McGee, Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between Property Rights and
Immigration Policy, 42 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 495 (1994).
3 For a discussion of this general philosophy in other equal protection arenas such
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response to economics, U.S. borders have had a fluctuating porosity in
their accommodation of alien labor, which has increased or decreased in
relationship to economic need, an issue that has remained a source of
conflict with regional powers, particularly neighboring Mexico?' Reli-
ance on alien labor has engendered an international debate with moral and
ethical overtones,327 clarifying in North America as a discussion over the
quality of alien entrant? 8 with legislators in the United States taking
the position that employers should be penalized for taking advantage of
unskilled, undocumented alien labor329 and should even be made to pay
in the event foreign workers are utilized before domestic workers 3" By
giving the alien controversy the appearance of a debate purely posited on
economics, those particularly in an adversary position have achieved a
as wealth-based classifications, welfare rights, and rights to government employment, see
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 62, §§ 14.25, 14.42-14.46.
326
The NAFrA agreement does not include migration issues. The Mexicans at first wanted
migration to be one of the themes of the agreement. The argument made by them was
that there are flows of two factors, capital and labor, both of which are important in
the structure of U.S.-Mexican relations. From the viewpoint of economic analysis, the
Mexicans argued that labor flows deserved an equal place with capital flows. However,
the United States was not prepared to talk about the movement of Mexican labor. Nor
was it clear precisely what aspect of the issue the Mexicans wanted to talk about
Except for the chapter that permits temporary migration of business people and techni-
cians, there are no immigration provisions in the NAFIA itself.
Sidney Weintraub, Free Trade and Migration: The Long-Term Impact, xvii IN DEFENSE
OF THE ALEN 8 (Lydio F. Tomasi, ed., 1995).
" See Jonas Widgren, Global Arrangements to Combat Trafficking in Migrants,
MIGRATION WORLD MAG., May 1, 1995, at 19 (describing an arrangement to combat
trafficking among governments for a "new and sustainable order which would diminish
the role of irregular movements of people between nations").
' See Trien T. Nguyen, The Parallel Market of Illegal Aliens: A Computational
Approach, 17 WORLD DEv. 1965 (1989) (one of a number of articles on alien quality
authored by Canadians, deriving from the Canadian national philosophy and policy to
encourage skilled aliens and discourage unskilled aliens).
329
Isolated labor shortages arose soon after employer penalties went into effect. The INS
made no effort to reach out and "educate" small business owners, despite evidence sug-
gesting that they often rely on undocumented workers, and some legal undocumented
workers lost their jobs due to employer fears of being cited by the [INS]. In other
situations, aliens fled the country because of deportation fears .... However, fears that
perishable fruits and vegetables would be left rotting in the fields failed to material-
ize .... Few employers appeared willing to increase wages as a means of overcoming
labor shortages.
Finch, supra note 36, at 251.
" See Steven A. Holmes, Immigration Panel Proposes Fee for Bringing in Foreign
Workers, N.Y. TIMaS, Sept. 13, 1995, at A20.
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kind of constitutional high ground, while such reductionism also aids the
economic elite in exploiting the tenuous legal status of the undocumented
alien.
The current Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
may well be returning to the days of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, essen-
tially deferring immigration to Congress. Also demonstratively deferential
to federal "plenary power" to enact, interpret, and administer immigration
laws, prior Courts for 100 years have had some impact in defining the
laws' scope. In contrast, the present Court has responded by taking up
four immigration cases - but deciding only one. Called upon to make
determinations, the Rehnquist Court may follow reasoning by the dissent
in cases like Nyquist v. Mauclet33t and Plyler v. Doe.332 The reasoning
of the dissent in these cases - essentially that the Supreme Court should
not intervene in processes entrusted to enaction by the legislative and
enforcement by the administrative branches of government - are at vari-
ance with the historic function of the Court to interpret the "phantom
norms" of the federal plenary immigration power.333 Although the Su-
432 U.S. 1 (1977).
Since the New York statute under challenge i[n] this case does not create a discrete and
insular minority by placing an inevitable disability based on status, the Court's height-
ened judicial scrutiny is unwarranted. The reason for the more rigorous constitutional
test having ceased, the applicability of the test should likewise cease.
Applying the rational-basis test, it is obvious that the statutory scheme in question
should be sustained. The funds that New York wishes to spend on its higher education
assistance programs are, of course, limited. New York's choice to distribute these limited
funds to resident citizens and to resident aliens who intend to become citizens, while
denying them to aliens who have no intention of becoming citizens, is a natural legisla-
tive judgment.
Id. at 21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The alien, a Canadian, had resided in the United
States for nine years, had registered with the Selective Service on his eighteenth
birthday, and had become eligible for a New York State Regents Scholarship. Id. at 5.
332 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
The Constitution does not provide a cure for every social ill, nor does it vest judges
with a mandate to try to remedy every social problem. Moreover, when this Court
rushes in to remedy what it perceives to be the failings of the political processes, it
deprives those processes of an opportunity to function. When the political institutions are
not forced to exercise constitutionally allocated powers and responsibilities, those powers,
like muscles not used, tend to atrophy. Today's cases, I regret to say, present yet
another example of unwarranted judicial action which in the long run tends to contribute
to the weakening of our political processes.
Id. at 253 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (citations omitted). Historically, during the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court has not been loathe at certain junctures to take "unwar-
ranted judicial action" in cases where aliens, immigrants, or the immigration power
were involved.
333 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
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preme Court is the "ultimate interpreter" '334 of the Constitution, when
called upon, the current bench may give inordinate weight to the principle
that:
"Ultimate interpreter" does not mean exclusive interpreter. The courts
expect other branches of government to interpret the Constitution in their
initial deliberations. "In the performance of assigned constitutional duties
each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution,
and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect
from the others."... Congressional interpretations are given substantial
weight in some circumstances, even to the point of becoming the
controlling factor .... 3"
Normative considerations need also be given weight as a factor in
the debate. Sidestepping issues by brandishing classic separation of
powers doctrine will not satisfy the duty of the Supreme Court to "say
what the law is," at those moments when it is required - not to reign in
- but prudently guide our legislative and executive branches in holding
true to U.S. constitutional traditions. At these junctures it may be neces-
sary to apply other standards supporting review of legislative and execu-
tive action, such as found in the philosophical tenets of natural law. Natu-
ral law or jus naturale, though not necessarily normative, is "intended to
denote a system of rules and principles for the guidance of human
conduct which, independently of enacted law or of the systems peculiar
to any one people, might be discovered by the rational intelligence of
man, and would be found to grow out of and conform to his nature,
meaning by that word his whole mental, moral, and physical constitu-
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545, 560
(1990).
Mhe plenary power cases provide, as a matter of explicit constitutional theory, that the
immigration context is different, and that therefore we cannot directly apply mainstream
constitutional norms in immigration cases. But "phantom constitutional norms" are
"constitutional" in the sense that they, having been at least seriously entertained as a
constitutional argument and in many cases actually adopted as an expressly constitutional
decision in other areas of law, then carry over to immigration cases, where they are
substantial enough to serve the limited function of informing interpretation of immigra-
tion statutes and other subconstitutional texts.
Id. at 564.
3 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
549 (1969).
Louis FIsHER, CONSTTUTIONAL DIALOGUES 243 (1988) (citations omitted)
(quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 64 (1981)).
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tion." ' Limitations inherent in this doctrine were made clear by Lewis
Carroll:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone,
"it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so
many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master - that's
all."
3 3 7
Though of seemingly mystical and amorphous character, natural law
has precedent in its application by the Supreme Court during at least two
periods of legal history: evolution of constitutionally mandated due
process safeguards for the trying of criminal defendants and elementally
in the development of "fundamental rights" involving procreation, birth
control, and abortion.3 ' Natural law, phantom constitutional norms, or
whatever label one prefers to use has not been withheld from analysis in
the context of alien rights and immigration. In the case of Bridges v.
Wixon,339 the Supreme Court said:
Our concern in this case does not halt with the fate of Harry Bridges,
an alien whose constitutional rights have been grossly violated. The
significance of this case is far reaching. The liberties of 3,500,000 other
aliens in this nation are also at stake. Many of these aliens, like many
of our forbears, were driven from their original homelands by bigoted
authorities who denied the existence of freedom and tolerance. It would
be a dismal prospect for them to discover that their freedom in the
United States is dependent upon their conformity to the popular notions
of the moment. But they need not make that discovery. The Bill of
Rights belongs to them as well as to all citizens. It protects them as
long as they reside within the boundaries of our land. It protects them
in the exercise of the great individual rights necessary to a sound
political and economic democracy. Neither injunction, fine, imprisonment
nor deportation can be utilized or prevent the exercise of intellectual
freedom. Only by zealously guarding the rights of the most humble, the
most unorthodox and the most despised among us can freedom flourish
and endure in our land.3"'
316 BLACK'S LAw DICnONARY, supra note 80, at 1026.
337 EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICAN LiERTY AND "NATURAL LAW" 140 (1953).
"3 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
3 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
3,o Id. at 165-66.
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These fine words were written at the close of the worst war the
world had ever seen, after world humanity had been sorely tested by the
abuses of National Socialism and other forms of totalitarianism. The
philosophy inhering in Bridges v. Wixon foretold the future humanistic
trend of Supreme Court decisions such as Takahashi and Graham v.
Richardson, which - except for the chilling period of the McCarthy era
- remained the general direction of development for individual rights,
such as those of the Texas schoolchildren in Plyler. In the late 1990s, the
U.S. Supreme Court may be poised to drift in a contrary direction,
particularly in the realm of alien rights. The potential for this change is
all the more possible in a Court that may see its role in interpreting the
federal plenary power as subordinated to the domain of the legislative and
executive branches
VI. CONCLUSION: WHEN THEY KNOCK, WHO WILL ANSWER?
And if a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not do him
wrong. The stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one
born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself?"
As of 1990, an immigration specialist estimated that about fifty-five
million immigrants had come to the United States during its history from
every part of the globe. 42 However, in 1995, legal immigration only
amounted to 720,000 individuals - a decline of about ten percent from
the 1994 total of more than 804,000, which in turn was a decline of
about eleven percent from the 1993 total of 904,000.' The decline in
legal immigration may partly frame the issues, because it can be argued
that hostility to undocumented aliens may be spilling over to legal
immigrants?" The presence of the foreign-born in our society remains
significant. To gain comparative perspective, today the foreign-born
represent about twenty-two million out of a total population of 260
'' Leviticus 19:33-34.
3 See CARLNER Er AL., supra note 15, at xi.
' See Schuck, supra note 185, at 1970.
344
Is Proposition 187 a firebell in the night (as was said of the Ded Scott decision),
warning of imminent civil conflict? Or is it instead just a flash in the pan, one more
California exotic that flourishes in that state's unique climate but fails to take root else-
where? Proposition 187, I believe, lies somewhere in between. It is less spasm of
nativist hatred than an expression of public frustration with a government and civil soci-
ety that seem out of touch and out of control, and with external convulsions that our
borders can no longer contain.
Schuck, supra note 10, at 85.
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million (nine percent), 5 while about ninety years ago, immigrants rep-
resented about ten million out of a total population of seventy-six million
(13.15%)."4 Many of the legal decisions that cabined the "immigrant
question" of those less sophisticated times were formulated by a judiciary
concerned by the rapid swelling of U.S. cities by an immigrant underclass
in a society less prepared, organized, or even willing to deal with socially
responsive issues. It can be convincingly shown that decisions by immi-
gration authorities today often echo an earlier period, 7 since many of
the early immigration-related judicial decisions remain in full force,
undisturbed by time.'
On today's law school campuses and in the courtroom, debate is
incessant on almost any and all aspects of the legal rights and status of
undocumented aliens. 9 Some of the debate's participants have even
argued for elimination of automatic citizenship for children of undocu-
See Schuck, supra note 185, at 1970.
Keller v. Ullman, 213 U.S. 138, 148 (1909).
v See, e.g., Larklam v. INS, 99 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 1996) (in a nonprecedential
opinion, the Ninth Circuit remanded case back to Board of Immigration Appeals, where
there was ample evidence that Burmese refugee should be deported to Thailand, his
previous domicile, not Burma, because of his well-founded fear of persecution by the
Burmese government, and neither Immigration Judge nor BIA made any findings as to
the facts); In re Pilch, File A29-603-413, 1996 WL 706595 (BIA 1996) (Polish aliens
denied extreme hardship exception as to deportability, despite fact petitioner had three
citizen children, for whom he was their sole support, was a partner in a construction
company employing 13 people full-time, and would forfeit $117,000 home, the BIA not
finding extreme hardship on the facts). But cf. In re X-P-T-, File A73-134-418, 1996
WL 727127 (BIA 1996) (Chinese female granted asylum, since she had been forced to
undergo forced sterilization and was therefore protected by Section 601(a)(1) of the
URIRA of 1996).
' Classic among these cases, of course, was Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581 (1889) (known as 'The Chinese Exclusion Case").
9 See Dennis L. Murphy, Note, The Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from the Reap-
portionment Base: A Question of Representation 41 CASE L. REv. 969 (1991) (arguing
that inclusion of aliens in the 1990 census violates the principle of one person one
vote); Robert Alan Culp, The Immigration and Naturalization Service and Racially
Motivated Questioning: Does Equal Protection Pick Up Where the Fourth Amendment
Left Off?, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 800 (1986) (providing evidence of INS officers ques-
tioning individuals merely on the basis of racial and ethnic characteristics); Paula Sue
Smith, An Argument Against Mandatory Reporting of Undocumented Immigrants by
State Officials, 29 CoLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 147 (1995) (arguing against Proposition
187 and similar movements in the southwestern U.S.); Mitchell Kurfis, The Constitu-
tionality of California's Proposition 187: An Equal Protection Analysis, 32 CAL. W. L.
REv. 129 (1995) (arguing in favor of Proposition 187).
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mented aliens, reaching back into the days of Lord Coke to find support
for their position?"
Economic issues remain at the forefront of discussion, particularly in
regard to the cost of public benefits, while the exploitation of alien
laborers continues a negative tradition of American history going back to
the mid- through late-nineteenth century. Mexican farmworkers, for
example, are caught up in this dynamic, between the push from a country
glad to see them leave and the pull of a country that wants their strong
backs, busy hands, and low expectation of earnings." Aliens have, on
occasion, found America to be a land where they were required to dwell
unseen in the shadows, where they have experienced a cultural dichotomy
and duality, perceiving themselves constrained to conceal their cultural
antecedents,3 2 sometimes discovering that the land where they dwell did
not even want them counted as constitutionally recognized "persons."3
And yet, New Yorkers and other Americans avidly witnessed the televised
spectacle of 296 alien Chinese who had been so eager to get to America,
that when their ship, the Golden Venture, ran aground near New York
City, they jumped overboard into the pounding surf to swim to shore,with
ten of their number being drowned3M
m See Dan Stein & John Bauer, Interpreting the 14th Amendment: Automatic
Citizenship for Children of Illegal Immigrants?, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 127 (1996).
351
Cesar Chavez [in the 1980s], President of the United Farmworkers of America, had
criticized severely the failure of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to prevent
California employers from using illegal aliens to break strikes of the United
Farmworkers. Chavez had said that for thirty years, the Service had maintained a policy
of neutrality in strikes, although the neutrality gave growers a free hand in using illegal
aliens as strikebreakers.
Douglas McCabe, Business and Labor: A Monolithic View Toward Immigration, in GEO.
IMM[GR. L. REP. 100 (Virginia A. Lazala ed., 1985).
-2 See generally PANG-Mm NATASHA CHANG, BouND FEET & WEsTERN DRESs
(1996) (providing a biographical account of a Chinese-American woman's great aunt,
who had lived in China during the first half of the eventful twentieth century, contrast-
ed with the author's reluctance to recognize and appreciate her own cultural identity).
13 Ridge v. Verity, 715 F.Supp. 1308, 1310 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (suit to block
inclusion of aliens in upcoming census for purposes of congressional apportionment).
' See Mills, supra note 111, at 11. Unlike the Chinese in the contemporaneous
case of the Pai Sheng, the Chinese aboard the Golden Venture did not achieve an
"entry," since they were spotted in U.S. waters off the coast by U.S. officials, making
them qualified for exclusion (little or no due process) rather than deportation proceed-
ings (due process). Xin Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 752-56 (2d Cir. 1995);
Yang v. Maugans, 64 U.S.L.W. 2302 (3d Cir. 1995), No. 95-7316. As of February
1997, about fifty-five of the debarkees from the Golden Venture remained behind bars
as detainees in York, Pennsylvania. See Celia W. Dugger, Dozens of Chinese From
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America has prided herself on being more than the sum of her parts,
currying the myth about her big heart, even in these economically trying
times. Accusations of xenophobia and nativism may be just that, or may
be reflexive behavior originating in public nostalgia for a bygone Ameri-
ca,355 general distrust of politicians,356 and a trend to engage in faddish
philosophizing, resembling the artifice of Victorian and late nineteenth
century proponents of the Poor Law and other legislation which had the
effect of punishing the poor for their oppression.'
The undocumented alien problem is a rapidly growing and swiftly
evolving social phenomenon - and the law hangs several years behind
the trend. Our statesmen and jurists have yet to conjure a proper solution
for the dilemma. Exclusion acts - racially, ethnically, or nationally based
- are not the answer. Options must be viewed in a larger world context.
One hundred years ago verse was penned in response to a gift the
United States received from a foreign government. The verse has taken
on a life of its own as a cultural artifact representing the American ideal.
Today, Americans must consider the now-familiar words and ponder
America's place in the world. As we revisit these famous lines we must
determine whether the words are charming relics of a bygone age, or they
shall serve us in our entree into the global century.
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name
Mother of exiles.
The New Colossus35
1993 Voyage Still in Jail, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1997, at Al.
" See Andrew Peyton Thomas, Can We Ever Go Back?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9,
1996, at A8.
' See Daniel Yankelovich, Restoring Public Trust, MOTHER JONES, Nov.-Dec. 1995,
at 28.
Richard Currie, Judging the Present by the Worst of the Past: Victorian Virtue
as Vice, Remarks at Luncheon in Celebration of 184th Anniversary of the Birth of
Charles John Huffam Dickens, hosted by the Friends of Dickens (Feb. 10, 1996), New
York City.
358 THE QUOTABLE WOMAN: 1800-1975 86 (Elaine Partnow, ed., 1977) (quoting
Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, 1886).
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